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ABSTRACT
A varied literature has emerged assessing the history and principles of the
SDI programme and its individual initiatives. Within the literature, a
widespread critique has developed that views the SD Is as falling short in two
crucial areas. First, the SDIs have, in general, had limited developmental
impacts . Second, many of the initiatives failed to develop adequate
institutional responses to the specific conditions they faced in their various
localities.
The study describes the Lubombo SDI and its anchor project, the Greater St
Lucia Wetland Park. It argues that the Lubombo SDI, from the outset, took
institutions seriously with a long view of development. It did not seek to
deliver large-scale investment in a short period. Rather, it focused on shifting
the development fundamentals - including key aspects of the Lubombo
region's institutional arrangements - and concentrating its resources on
facilitating a major project capable of pulling the various agencies with a
stake in the region's development onto a common platform. This
concentration of effort, and the creation of a dedicated authority with a clear
statutory mandate to promote development and conservation, has brought
advances to an area where development was effectively blocked for many
years. But the dynamic nature of the institutional environment remains a key
challenge affecting the GSLWP and the execution of the Authority's
mandate. The ability of the Authority to continue mediating the multiple
tensions and complexities affecting the GSLWP will be crucial if the agenda
first set by the Lubombo is to be carried forward in the coming years.
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ORJENTATION TO THE STUDY
1. Introduction
This study focuses on the Lubombo SDI and its anchor project, the Greater St Lucia Wedand
Park. Its aim is to analyse the Lubombo SDI, and the establishment of the GSLWP, in the
context of the government's Spatial Development Initiatives programme.
The study takes place against the background of the now substantial literature arguing the
difficulties encountered by various SDIs to develop adequate responses to local conditions. A
varied literature has emerged assessing the history and principles of the SDI programme as
well as its individual initiatives. Within this literature, a widespread critique has developed that
views the SDIs as falling short in two crucial areas. First, the SDIs have, in general, had
limited developmental impacts. Second, many of the initiatives failed to develop appropriate
institutional responses to the specific conditions they faced in their various localities.
Yet, the Lubombo SDI has paid careful attention to regional institutional structuring and has
attempted to develop an "adequate institutional response" in order to enable improved
regional economic performance in future. The study examines the manner in which the
Lubombo SDI and its anchor project, the Greater St Lucia Wedand Park, have attempted to
shift the development fundamentals in the Maputaland region by not only delivering physical
infrastructure but also reconfiguring the region's institutional arrangements and their
associated development path.
In considering the Lubombo SDI and its anchor project, the two-pronged critique developed
in the literature is of vital interest. Against the background of this critique, the study examines
the following two key questions:
• Has the Lubombo SDI achieved greater developmental reach than 1S generally
acknowledged in the literature on other SDIs?
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• And has it, in the words of Harrison "developed an adequate institutional mechanism"
to shift the region's development fundamentals (1998:3)?
In exploring these questions, the study examines the manner in which the Lubombo SDI and
its anchor project, the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park, have attempted to shift the
development fundamentals in the Maputaland region by not only delivering physical
infrastructure but also reconfiguring the region's institutional arrangement and its associated
development path. It did not seek to deliver large-scale investment in a short period. Rather,
it focused on shifting the development fundamentals of the Lubombo region by establishing
a track record of delivery and concentrating its resources on facilitating a major project
capable of pulling the various agencies with a stake in the region's development onto a
common platform.
The principal focus of the study is on the Lubombo SDI from its start in 1996 to
approximately 2002 when its major institutional intervention - the GSLWP Authority -
became fully operational in effect taking on the functions of the Lubombo SDI. The history
of the Authority since its establishment, including the many challenges it currently faces, are
largely beyond the scope of the study and are therefore only briefly sketched. Nevertheless,
the study does, in conclusion, raise some of the key risks faced by the Authority in carrying
forward its mandate .
2. Structure of the study
Chapter 2 places the SDI programme within the context ~f regional policy development in
South Africa, particularly as an instrument of post-apartheid regional planning. It briefly
locates the SDI programme in general, and the Lubombo SDI in particular, within the
context of globalisation and regionalisation, twin processes that have recently spawned an
international resurgence in the study of regionalism. It does so by drawing on Harrison's
useful overview (1998) but also by referring extensively to the work of Amin (1999), Morgan
(1997) and Storper (2004). These writers have brought an "institutionalist" tum to the
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regional development literature, which draws attention to the broadly conceived institutional
structures that underpin regional economies and development paths .
Thereafter, it examines the programme within its South African frame, referring to the rich
literature on SDrs that has emerged in recent years. It highlights some of the main themes in
the literature, particularly two widely repeated criticisms. First, the idea that the developmental
impacts of the SDrs have been disappointing particularly when measured against the
ambitious claims made in the early years of the programme. Second, the notion that many of
the initiatives failed to develop "adequate institutional responses" to the specific conditions
they faced in their various localities.
Chapter 3 sketches the history of the Lubombo SDI. It provides a brief overview of the
background to the Lubombo initiative, particularly the mining controversy of the late-1980s
and early-1990s and the entrenchment of a ''low-road'' development trajectory in
Maputaland during the closing decades of the last century. It describes the early history of the
Lubombo SDr, its underpinning analysis and its institutional structure. After this, the suite of
interventions promoted by the Lubombo SDr during the first phase of its implementation are
described. These were designed to lay the basis for a broad-based improvement in the
region's development fundamentals. The chapter stresses that the Lubombo SDr always took
a long view of the development process. Shifting the development fundamentals in an area
such as that targeted by the Lubombo SDr required a much longer process than the "fast
track" envisaged by mainstream SDr planners. The Lubombo SDr also understood the need
to build political support for the project not just at the highest level - although this was
crucial - but also at the provincial and local levels. Moreover, delivery in an area afflicted by
extreme poverty and infrastructure deficits, had to be shaped not only by the grand logic of
the SDr but also by the immediate social and economic needs of the area's inhabitants.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Lubombo SDI's anchor project, from its initial
conceptualisation to its eventual implementation. The focus is on the period from 1997, when
the SDr first defined the identified the Greater St Lucia Wedand Park as a project capable of
stimulating significant economic growth in the Lubombo area, to approximately 2002 when
the GSL\V'P Authority became fully operational. The main concern in the chapter is to
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describe how the Lubombo SD I sought to put in place the fundamentals required to
implement its anchor project, particularly an institutional structure with the capacity to drive
the economic renewal of the GSLWP.
The final chapter briefly returns to the developmental impacts and institu tional aspects of the
Lubombo SDI and the GSLWP. The creation of a dedicated authority with a clear statutory
mandate to promote development and conservation brought advances to an area where
development was effectively blocked for many years. But the dynamic nature of the
institutional environment remains a key challenge affecting the Park and the execution of the
Authority's mandate . The ability of the Authority to continue mediating the multiple tensions
and complexities affecting the GSL\W will be crucial if the agenda first set by the Lubombo
SDI is to be carried forward in the coming years.
3. A Note on Terminology and Methodology
Greater St Lucia Wetland Park (also GSLWP or Park) and GSLWP Authority (or
Authority):
Regulations published in November 2000 in terms of the World Heritage Convention Act of
1999 formally proclaimed the Grea ter St Lucia Wetland Park and established a new, purpose-
designed statutory body, the GSLWP Authority, to develop, oversee and manage the Park.
Spatial Development Initiative or SDI:
Chapter 2 defines the concept by drawing on the extensive literature dealing with the topic.
This literature includes both primary texts developed for DTI by key drivers of the
programme and a variety of support agencies, most notably the D evelopment Bank of
Southern Africa. It also includes secondary literature in which various writers have
contextualised the SDI programme in terms of regional policy practices internationally and
the new constitutional and macro-economic frameworks nationally.
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Region:
In the case of the SDI programme, the term "region" is used to refer to a loosely boundaried
territory which is the focus of a given SDI. This may be a transnational area such as is in the
case of the Lubombo SDI or the Maputo Corridor, or a subnational area such as in the case
of the Richards Bay SDI, the Wild Coast SDI, etc. In the dissertation, the term will be used,
following Harrison (1998), principally to refer to a subnational territory. In the discussion of
the Lubombo SDI, the focus will be on the South African component of the programme, i.e.
a subnational territory situated in the far north of KwaZulu-Natal which largely coincides
with the boundaries of the new uMkhanyakude District Municipality.
4. Metho dology
As the Lubombo SDI project manager and Chief Executive Officer of the GSLWLP
Authority, I have been intimately involved in the subject of this study from the
conceptualisation of the Lubombo SDI to the present. I have therefore been, and continue
to be, a participant in the process which the study analyses. My position brings some
advantages. It has meant that I have immersed myself in the subject for many years and that I
have access to key documentary material related to the SDI process and the establishment of
the GSLWP Authority, some of which is not in the public domain. This literature constitutes
the main source of primary data for the study.
However, my involvement in the Lubombo SDI and GSLWP also brings certain limitations.
The most obvious is the question of possible bias - the threat that my objectivity has been
compromised by my participation in the subject of the study. I am a player in an initiative that
has attempted to stimulate new development in a region that has stagnated for many years.
This has involved a political dimension, which is discussed at some length in the study. The
point here is that I acknowledge that my involvement in a complex regional development
initiative brings with it the possibility of limited perspective and bias. I have attempted to
counter this by considering various views on the topic. This includes a review of the now
extensive SDI literature written by a wide range of thinkers as well a series of interviews with
key players involved in the SDI programme in general and the Lubombo SDI in particular.
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The study considers the data collected from these sources within the conceptual framework




THE SOUTH AFRICAN SDI PROGRAMME
1. Introduction
'This chapter places the SDI programme within the context of regional policy development in
South Africa, particularly as an instrument of post-apartheid regional planning. It briefly
locates the SDI programme in general, and the Lubombo SDI in particular, within the
context of globalisation and regionalisation, twin processes that have recendy spawned an
international resurgence in the study of regionalism.
It does so by drawing on Harrison's useful overview (1998) but also by referring extensively
to the work of Amin (1999), Morgan (1997) and Storper (2004). These writers have brought
an "institutionalist" turn to the regional development literature, which draws attention to the
broadly conceived institutional structures that underpin regional economies and development
paths.
Thereafter, the chapter exarrunes the SDI programme within its South African frame,
referring to a range of primary texts developed by individuals and institutions associated with
the SDI programme. This includes the definitive work of Jourdan (1997), Goldin and
Jourdan (1996), Jourdan et al (1998) as well as other SDI managers and practitioners
(including Platzky, 1998 and Altman 2001a and b). It also includes internal documents -
many unpublished - prepared for the Lubombo SDI. In placing the SDI programme within
its South African context, the chapter also draws on a second - fast expanding - category of
literature. 'This work, which reflects on the broader SDI programme as well as individual
initiatives, may be considered secondary literature prepared by writers not direcdy involved in
the implementation of the SDIs. It locates the programme within South Africa's new macro-
economic and political frameworks, and brings a critical perspective to the programme and its
individual initiatives. The chapter draws extensively on this writing including the work of,
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amongst others, Harrison, 1998; Platzky, 2000; Rogerson, 1998; Adebayo and Todes, 2003;
1998; and Soderbaum and Taylor, 2003).
2. The Return to Regional Theory
Recent years have seen an international revival of interest in the "regional question" (Keating
and Loughlin, 1997:1). This upsurge may be considered a theoretical response to the multiple
processes of regionalism which, together with globalisation, may be considered a qualitatively
new phenomenon rapidly transforming the contemporary world'. ''The new regionalism is a
truly world-wide phenomenon, taking place in more areas of the world than ever before"
(Soderbaum and Taylor, 2003a: 11).
According to Harrison, writing in the late-nineties :
There is now, international!J, a clear return to full recognition of the inevitability and
desirability ofregionalpolity. This renewedawareness ofregionalpolity ispatt!J a result of
innovative andprogressive thinking emergingf rom the European Union, although there are
important contributionsfrom otherparts ofthe world The other kry reason for heightened
awareness ofthe role of regionalpolity is resu'l,ent regionalism as regionalpolity is often a
response to the demands (and, sometimes, threats) ofregionalism (1998:2).
One example of the thinking from within the European Union is the work of Guerra who
argues that the recent period has witnessed a resurgence in regional theory and practice after
the "crisis" following the global economic downturn of the 1970s. However, unlike the
relative consensus of the two post-war decades, the period since the 1980s has not seen the
emergence of "a well-established alternative regional development 'paradigm'" (1997:3).
Harrison concurs: "In the 1980s, there was some talk of the 'death of regional policy' but
1 ''With regard to context, the new regionalism needs to be related to the current transformation of the
world: regions are not formed in a vacuum. Here globalisation is a key to further understanding.
Globalisation and regionalisation are intimately connected, and must be understood within the same
framework, together shaping the emerging world order" (Soderbaum and Taylor, 2003a: 11).
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what was meant, in fact, was the abandonment of a particular form of regional policy and of
specific instruments of regional policy (e.g. the growth pole)" (1998:2). Instead, regional
policy currently mixes "new models and old strategies" and displays remarkable variety within
Europe and across the globe (Guerro, 1997:73t
Despite its "remarkable variety", thinkers such as Amin stress certain commonalities in the
new writing on regional development. Until recently, Amin argues, regional policy was "finn-
centred, incentive-based and state-driven" (1999: 365). This is true of both the Keynesian
approach that dominated regional policy in the majority of capitalist economies after the
1960s as well as in the pro-market neo-liberal experiments that have come to the fore more
recently:
The common assumption in both approaches, despite theirfundamentai differences over the
necessiryfor state intervention andover the equilibratingpowers ofthe market, has been that
top-down polides can be applied universallY to all types of region. This agreement seems to
draw on the belief thatat the heart ofeconomicsuccess lies a set ofcommon factors «s the
rational individual, the maximii}ng entrepreneur, the firm as a basic economic unitandso
on). (Amin, 1999:365.)
Partly in response to the failings of both these approaches - which have by-and-large failed to
stimulate self-sustaining growth based on the mobilization of local resources and
interdependencies, especially in the so-called less favoured regions (LFRs) - thinking on
regional development has recently shifted:
2 However, despite their innovation and diversity, the new frameworks are sometimes criticized for
their focus on the developed world, especially Europe, to the exclusion- or at least the neglect- of
Africa and "the dynamic processes of regionalisation on this continent". According to Soderbaurn
and Taylor, much of the new regional theory was developed first and foremost for the study of
Europe, which forms the "standard case" against which other regionalisms are measured - "a
particular reading of European integration influence(s) the description and prescription of
regionalism in the rest of the world" (2003a: 10).
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· . . more innovative poliry communities have begun to explore an alternatioe ... centred on
mobilii!ng the endogenous potential of the LFRs, through efforts to upgrade a broadlY
defined localsupPlY-base. It seeks to unlock the 'wealth of regions' as theprime source of
developmentand renewal. This is notan approach with a coherent economictheory behind
it, noris there a consensus on the flCcessary poliry actions. However, its axioms contrast
sharplY with those of thepoliry orthodoxy, in tending tofavour bottom-up, regjon-specific,
longer-tew andplural-actor basedpoliry actions. ConceptualY, against the individualism of
the orthodoxy . .. it recognizes the collective orsocialfoundations ofeconomic behaviour, fOr
which reason it can be described looselY as an institutionalist perspective on regjonal
development. (Amin, 1999:366.)
This approach recognizes that economic behaviour is embedded in a set of particular local
circumstances. Regional development is shaped by regional peculiarities rooted in multi-
dimensional societal processes that require careful consideration of their specific
circumstances and settings (Soderbaum and Taylor, 2003a: 10). As such, regional
development interventions such as the SDIs must link into endogenous potentials in a locally
specific manner. This requires a "bottom-up" method which engages seriously with local
conditions and actors. It also shifts attention towards a supply-side approach; mobilizing the
inherent potential of a region requires a set of interventions designed to improve what Amin
calls the region's "broadly defined supply-base". In this context, institutions become vitally
important'. Institutions are here understood in the broadest sense to include both formal
institutions such as rules, laws and organisations, as well as informal or tacit "institutions"
such as individual habits, group routines, social norms and other interpersonal networks." If
In recentyear.f no one canfail to have noticed thegrowing interest within economics in the roleand nature ofsoaal
institutions, a welcome, ifbelated, reaction to theunder-socialized conceptions ofneoclassicaleconomics. A the most
abstnut level the concept of an 'institution' in this literature refer.r to recurrent patter.r of behaviour - habits,
cantentions and routines. (Morgan, 1997: 493).
4 See also Storper (2004: 2):
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economic behaviour is embedded in a set of locally-specific institutions, then it follows that
any attempt to stimulate regional development must take social institutions seriously. It also
follows that institutions vary considerably from region to region, and that development
interventions must therefore be tailored individually to respond to the specific conditions of a
particular region.
The institutionalist perspective has important implications for regional development studies.
First, the idea that economic behaviour is embedded in networks of interpersonal relations
suggests that "economic outcomes are influenced by network properties such as mutuality,
trust and cooperation, or their opposite" (Amin, 1999: 367). Such properties are closely
related to the concept of "social capital", which can be defined in the following way:
By analogy with notions ofphysicalcapital and human capital - tools and training that
enhance individualproductiviry - social capital rifers tofeatures ofsocial organisation, such
as networks, norms andtrust, thatfacilitate coordination andcooperationfor mutualbenifit.
Social capital enhances the benifits of investment in pl!)sical and human capital and is
coming to be seen as a vital ingredientin economic development around the world. (putnam,
1993, quotedin Morgan, 1997: 493).
"Robust regions" (Morgan, 1997: 495) are characterised by high levels of social capital that are
conducive to fostering the innovation and learning on which contemporary capitalism thrives.
On the other hand, LFRs are generally characterised by poor developmental capacity. This is
due to the relative absence of physical infrastructure and qualified labour. But in addition to
these conventional weaknesses:
"Institutions" refers not onlY to the jo1771al private andpublic sector organizations and rules which iifluence
how agents interact, but also the relativelY stable colective routines, habits, or conventions that can be
observed in a'!Y economy. Institutions havema'!Yjunctions, including the redistribution ofwealth, definition
ofproperry nghts, govemanceofji1771Sand labor relations, themleoflaw, and resolutions ojdisputes. These
kinds ojinstitutions vary greatlY among countries and have significant impacts on economic peformano. and
socio-economicstructures.
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LFRs seem to have little or no social capital on which thry can draw, a point which turns
the spotlight onfactors such as the institutional capaciry of the region, the calibre of the
political establishment, the disposition to seek j oint solutions to common problems. These
factors - the invisiblefactors in economic development - are just as important asp~sical
capital. (Morgan, 1997: 496.)
Second, the idea that the economy is shaped by enduring collective forces suggests a degree
of stability or "path-dependency". "Institutions, as networks of human relationships, are to
some extent historically path-dependent, in the sense that they develop through repetition,
and they are shaped by identifiable pre-existing relationships" (Hall, 1999: 5).
All of these institutions ... are also ... templates for, or constraints upon, future
development. It is their endurabiliry andframing influence on action fry individuals and
actor networks thatforces recognition of the path-andcontext-dependent nature of economic
life, or, from a governance perspective, the wide field of institutions beyond markets, firms
and states which need to be addressed fry policies seeking to alter the economic trqjectory.
[Amm, 1999:367).
From these strands of thought emerge an understanding of regional economies as "a
composition of collective influences which shape individual action, and as a diversified and
path-dependent entity moulded by inherited cultural and socio-institutional influences"
(Amin, 1999: 368). Of crucial importance are the mixtures of strengths and weaknesses that
determine the development paths of particular regions. Certain regions are claimed to be
"learning" or "intelligent" regions with the capacity to retain and develop their competitive
advantage. By contrast, many LFRs suffer from institutional deficits and are locked into
suboptimal development paths:
The LFRs face a daunting task in reconstmcting local social capital, damaged as it mqy be
fry decades of economic hardship, state dependenty, elite domination and so on. {Amin,
1999:373).
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The focus in the new regionalism is thus on building the wealth of regions, which is
particularly difficult in the highly constrained LFRs. This involves a broad approach which
seeks to upgrade the economic, institutional and social base of a given region:
Thus, local effort mightfocus ondeveloping the supplY base (from skillsthrough to education,
innovation and communications) and the institutional base (from development agencies to
business organizations andautonomouspoliticalrepresentation) in order to makeparticular
sites into key staging points or centres ofcompetitive advantage within global value chains.
(AHlin, 1999:370.)
The literature focusing on post-apartheid regionalism and regional policy, particularly the
various initiatives co-ordinated by the South African Department of Trade and Industry
(DT!) within the country's new political and macro-economic frameworks, participate in the
international revival of interest in regional planning. The renewed attention to South African
regional policy has, of course, taken place against the background of the apartheid state's past
manipulation of space in pursuit of its ideological agenda. South African writers reflecting on
the spatial characteristics of the country and the post-1994 attempts to address past
inequalities inevitably confront the legacy of apartheid social engineering. "South Africa's
regional policy experience cannot be understood apart from its political history" (Harrison,
1998: 5). Howarth and O'Keefe argue that a "spatial approach is necessary because of the
geographical divisions in the South African economy, intentionally created by the apartheid
administration" (2000: 1). Rogerson states:
ApartheidSouth Africa enjoyed a long history ofattempting to organize the spatial syste»:
as a tool for social engineering and the management of urbani~tion [I..emon, 1976J.
During the apartheid period an arsenal ofpoliry measures, including regjonal development
planning, were applied to stem the urbanization ofblack South .Africans into the country's
large metropolitan areas. One of the mCljor setofchanges that has occurred with the shift
from apartheid topost-apartheid South Africa is the introduction ofa suite ofnew policies
which are designed to restruaure the inherited inequalities of the apartheid economy and,
correspondingly, to dftcta newpost-apartheid spatial economy (1998: 187).
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And Platzky argues, "Space was, and continues to be, central to understanding South African
society... The apartheid state used space strategically to separate, and hence to control
people... Consequently a majority government was expected to restructure this unnatural,
skewed space economy" (1998:1t
Many of these writers have been influenced by the "institutionalist turn" in the contemporary
literature on regional development. TIlls has meant, for example, that the literature on the
various SDIs often gives careful consideration to regional institutional structure and the
manner in which the centrally conceived SDI programme links into, and interplays with, local
potentials and constraints. Hall summarises this view in his analysis of the Richards Bay SDI:
. . . diffirencesin reionalimplementation ofthe nationalprogram reflect regional diffirences
in the outcome ofnegotiation and bargaining processes between national and local interests.
Such a view highlights the importance ofresearch into the similaritiesanddifferences between
the SDls, and exploring how the values and imperatives of the national program are
communicated to, andmediated fry, regional actors andinstitutions. (1999:4).
TIlls has led to a rich and varied literature on the different SDIs which is discussed below.
5 The spatial impact of colonisation and apartheid was, of course, not limited to South or southern
Africa. The African continent as a whole is today characterised by complex processes of
regionalisation that are often cross-border in nature rather than contained within the boundaries of a
particular nation-state. According to Soderbaum and Taylor, this is due to many factors including
"the permeability of national borders and the 'surface nature' of most nation-state projects on the
continent. These.. . Afro-regions appear in various guises: they might be sub-national or cross-
border ; formal or informal; 'real'/ cultural or policy driven and so forth" (2003a: 1). The economic
dimension of the Afro-regions is often based in ancient migratory and trading patterns later
incorporated into colonial and postcolonial capitalist economies.
The flow of people and goods - both formal and informal- continues to shape the spatial economy
of South and southern Africa. Many of the SDls, particularly the much-cited Maputo
Development Corridor but also others such as the Lubombo SDI, may thus be regarded as policy-
driven attempts seeking to build on such historically-rooted and cross-border networks, "in a wider
attempt to restructure the ...region along certain, more guided, lines" (2003a: 6).
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3. The SDr programme
Prominent in the South African literature on regionalism is an examination of one of the new
government's most ambitious post-apartheid regional interventions, the so-called SDIs that
were launched soon after the transition to democracy." The SDI programme that followed
refers to a package of strategic government initiatives that "potentially may furnish a basis for
a radical restructuring of the contours of the national space economy via the spatial
consequences or outworkings of new sectoral initiatives" (Rogerson, 1998:189). According to
Soderbaum and Taylor: "Since the mid-1990s the SDIs and development corridors have
emerged as the most distinct and probably the most interesting form of policy-driven micro-
regionalism in South and southern Africa" (2003a:1).
The SDI concept was conceived in 1996 "as a way of generating growth and investment in
regions where there is significant potential for growth which was not realized for historical
and political reasons" (Adebayo and Todes, 2003:5). The programme was initially located in
the Department of Trade and Industry with support from the Development Bank of
Southern Africa, although the Department of Transport and, in later years, the Department
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, also sponsored certain SDIs. By 2001 the
programme had been largely dismantled and replaced by the Regional SD I Programme, which
now operates in various parts of the Southern African Development Community (Adebayo
and Todes, 2003: 3).
The SDIs have been extensively discussed by a group of practitioners based in the major
government departments and parastatal agencies involved in the design, implementation and
evaluation of the programme. Conceived as "a short-term fast track programme" (platzky,
2000: 7), the SDI concept draws on a miscellany of international examples without being
clearly rooted in any international best-practice model (Iourdan, 1997:1). In this sense, the
6 A bibliography prepared for the OTI in 2001 noted 641 titles dealing either with the SOl programme
in general or with one or more of the individual SOls (OTI, 2001). Since its publication, the list has
grown as the various SOls mature and writers gain the distance to reflect on their outcomes.
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SDI programme is one of the many examples from across the globe of the re-emergence in
regional planning: it mixes a broad understanding of international practice with a set of
domestic requirements to forge a national (and international) programme of regional
interventions.
From the outset, the SDIs were explicitly positioned within the context of South Africa's new
macro-economic strategy, particularly as embodied in the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) plan (RSA, 1996a). Indeed, the SDI programme is often presented as
one of the South African state's key interventions in support of its post-apartheid industrial
policy objectives:
This initiative mustbe placed in the context ofthe newparadigm adopted by the government
ofSouth Africa. A kry component of thisparadigm is the move awqy from the protected
and isolated approach to economic development towards one in which international
competitiveness, regional co-operation, and a more diversified ownership base is
paramount. .. This form of targeting is considered to be particularlY appropriate in the
currentperiod ofmajor shifts in ouroverall industrial strategy, from apredominantlY import
substitution driven manufacturing sector, to outward orientation through international
competitiveness.
(Jourdan, etal, 1997: 1,2)
The shift towards an outward-oriented economy lies at the heart of GEAR. The new policy
calls not only for "a concerted expansion of export industries" (Rogerson, 1998: 188) but for
the removal of a series of constraints which will "catapult the economy to the higher levels of
growth, development and employment needed to provide a better life for all South Africans"
(RSA, 1996a:2). It seeks "to plug into ongoing globalisation processes and craft South Africa
as a 'competition state' i.e. exploit South Africa's perceived competitive advantages and
develop its international competitiveness" (Taylor, 2000:5). Key to the achievement of
GEAR's objectives is private sector capital formation: against a background of escalating
public expenditure and declining foreign direct investment during the closing years of
apartheid, GEAR explicitly recognises the limitations of the national fiscus, commits
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Government to rapid deficit reduction, and targets private investment as the major driver of
economic growth.
Against this background, the principal architect of the SDI programme, Paul Jourdan,
described the SDIs as "a set of initiatives concerned with unlocking the inherent un/under-
utilised development potential of certain strategically important spatial locations in South
Africa" (1997: 2t Individual SDIs vary spatially and structurally "depending on the nature
of their underlying economic potential and existing economic activity" (1997:2). All SDIs
however share a clearly defined set of objectives. Jourdan et al (1997: 2-3) describe these as:
Firstfy, to gC11erate sustainable economic growth and developmC11t in rr:lativefy under-
developed areas, according to the inherent economicpotential ofthelocali!).
Secondfy, togC11erate long-term andsustainable employmentfor the local inhabitants of
the SDI area andfor the nation ingeneraL
• Thirdfy, to maximise the extent to which private sector inoestmen! and lending can be
mobilised into the SDI area.
Fourthfy, to exploit the spin-oJ!opportunities thatarisesfrom this relative crowding-in of
private andpublic sector investments.
Finalfy, to exploit the under-utilised locational and economic advantages for export-
orientatedgrowth ofthe SDls.
(Jourdan etal, 1997:2-3)
The SDIs thus participate in the contemporary approach to regional development described
above. They are region-specific interventions explicitly designed to mobilize endogenous
potential "through efforts to upgrade a broadly defined local supply-base" (Amin, 1999: 366).
7 Elsewhere, Jourdan et al write: "The SDls are aimed at unlocking economic potential in specific
spatial locations in order to create jobs, grow the economy of the area, and to contribute to
restructuring the ownership patterns in the South African economy, in line with the objectives set
out in the government's macro-economic strategy (GEAR)" (1997: 3).
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By contrast to the earlier Keynesian regional policy and apartheid-style decentralisation ''both
of which subsidized private sector investment in economically marginal areas, the focus was
on areas of high potential, on supply side interventions, and on "crowding in" of private
sector investment" (Adebayo and Todes, 2003:5).
Although initially emerging in policy formulation around "development corridors" - notably
the so-called Maputo Development Corridor - the SDI programme rapidly expanded to
encompass different types and areas. These included regional industrial SDIs, "agri-tourism"
SDIs, mixed industrial and agri-tourism SDIs, focused Industrial Development Areas and
metropolitan corridors Qourdan et al, 1997). At its height, the programme included 14
initiatives including several that had cross-border elements.
Methodologically, the SDIs were designed as "fast track" interventions "meant to take place
over a short period of approximately one year. National government would help to push
forward or fast-track the development process, and then local or regional institutions would
take over" (Altman, 2001: 27). Soderbaum describes the rapid approach thus:
Thisplanning process emphasises speeqy implementation andthe removal 0/bottlenecks and
constraints to investment, which are often infrastmctural in nature (roads, ports, railwqys) or
trade-related(borderposts, trade procedures). . .. There is considerable emphasis on rast-
tracking"project implementation, andthe set-up, appraisal, packaging andlaunch 0/a SDI
at the investors conference is supposed to be completed within 12-18 months. The exit
strategy isgiven longer time, up to twoy ears.
(2004: 60-61)
During this limited time frame, the SDI methodology seeks "to identify and then facilitate
economic potential in particular locations in South Africa by enhancing their attractiveness
for investment" (Taylor, 2000:2): It does this by:
Identifying an SDI thatfits the required profile, particularlY an area 0/ inherent, but
under-utilised, economicpotential;
Appointing a smallproject team backed fry a seniorpolitical champion and empll!Jed
Iry the national DTI;
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Identifying mcY0r factors constmining investment and mounting a concerted effort to
remove these "bottlenecks ': often through publicprivatepartnerships (PPPs) such as the
Maputo Toll Roadandvarious tourism developmentprojects.8
Identifying, appraising and promoting potential investment opportunities, particularlY
one or more propulsive 'anchor' projects designed to serve as magnets to additional
downstream or related investments, there!?y expanding the size and scope oj fa given)
sector within theSDI area.
(Jourdan, 1997:2).
The SDIs were thus conceived as limited programmes of central involvement during which
national government intervenes at the regional level to change the development trajectory of
high potential but under-performing areas. During the phase of national involvement, key
tasks of individual SDI managers include not only investment promotion but also embedding
the programme at the local level. This latter requirement - engaging local institutional
realities and bridging the gap between the national and regional levels - is a crucial issue
which is discussed furth er below. In the mean time, it suffices to note that the SDI
methodology envisages a phased approach during which an initial intervention from the
centre "hands over" to local champions and institutions:
Thefirst phase ojthe SDI process - which is national government driven - is conducted
within a short space ojtime, typicallY 12 - 18 months. The second phase ojthe SDI
programme is the project implementation phase, during which local and provincial
institutions become the k ey drivers ojthe SDI. SDls are then driven from the local or
provincial investmentpromotion agencies, whose main brief is tofacilitate new investment
into the region. A furthermechanismfor embedding the SDI processeslocallY is through the
8 Typically, these constraints were perceived to be infrastructural in nature involving deficits in 'hard'
infrastructure such as roads, ports, rail systems, etc. "The SDI project management teams work
closely with the various line departments responsible for implementation - at local, provincial and
national levels of government - to ensure that those items of infrastructure which are strategic to
the success of the SDI are prioritised" (Iourdan, 1997: 2).
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establishment oflocal or regional clusterprocesses, which bringsfirms across the supply chain
togetherto develop strategies to enhance collective efficiencies.
(Jourdan, 1997: 4)
4. Critical Perspectives on the SDr Programme
The emergence of an extensive body of scholarly work focusing on the SDIs provides fertile
ground for those wishing to reflect on some of the key policy questions and outcomes
relating to the spatial distribution of resources and activities in contemporary South Africa.
Within the emerging literature, it is increasingly possible to identify some broad themes,
which often bring a critical perspective to the SDI programme and its methodology.
4.1 Developmental impacts
4.1.1 Overstated economic targets
It is now widely accepted that the SDI architects vastly over-stated the potential of the SDIs,
particularly in making bold claims about the programme's ability to attract investment and
create jobs in the short-term. The following quotation from Altman is typical of a broad
consensus that early and official SDI literature overreached in stating the probable impacts of
the programme:
The SDI qffice made great claims in regard to potential investment that would be
forthcoming. There was much exuberance in the qffice, but also a need to communicate
confidence in the programmes to bring forward this interest. The web site announced that:
'Seven of South Africa's SDls have identified nearlY 800 investment opportunities worth
$32,4 billion with the capaciry to create 85,000jobs and are cumnt/y marketing these
projects topotential investors through a varie!y ofmechanisms'.
This was a very ambitious claim in a context of slow economic growth, and certainlY there
wasfar less interest in South Africa lryforeign investors than was initial/y envisaged.
(Altman, 2001: 24)
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This emphasis on large-scale economic outputs quantified in terms of investment and jobs
focused attention on these outcomes rather than progress in laying the foundations for broad-
based shifts in areas of economic under-capacity. "In fact, regional development is almost
always very risky, and requires many years to really bear fruit with employment and
investment multipliers. This is even truer in relation to under-developed regions and in the
context of slow economic growth at a national level" (Altman, 2001: 24).
This overstatement of potential outcomes was probably at least in part the result of an
implicit - but misguided - assumption by SDI planners of widespread informational market
failure in the targeted regions. The programme was in large part predicated "on a belief that
concentrated investment promotion activities, supported by key infrastructure investments,
can deliver much-ne eded jobs" (Hall, 1999: 7). This unstated assumption fundamentally
underestimated the constraints blocking investment and economic growth at the level of
South Africa's historically neglected regions:
In the context 0/striking structura!imbalances in the South Af rican economy, theSDIs set
itself a very diJficult task: to focus on less-developed regjons, rather than areas with
agglomerations; andto emphasizeprivatefinanceinpublicgoods, ratherthan to ensure that
programmes moved forward with clear public sector commitment. The SDIs were
implementedover aperiod 0/ tight spending controls, andso the programme was notbacked
by strong infrastmcture spendingprogrammes.
(Altman, 2001: 24)
Another way of stating this, is to argue that - although the SDI were region-specific
interventions designed to unlock local potential - the SDI planners underestimated the
institutional constraints operative in the regions targeted by the programme. Many of the
SDI-target areas are indeed LFRs which, as was described above, suffer from severe shortages
of social capital that lock them into low growth development cycles. In such areas, the
delivery of "physical capital" in the form of hard infrastructure combined with investment
promotion activities are unlikely to catalyse sustainable new development. In addition to such
delivery, catalyst projects must address "the invisible factors in economic development"
(Morgan, 1997: 496) - the social capital and institutional capacity - that impede innovation
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and renewal. If the gains are to be sustainable such interventions must develop uruque
strategies based on deep assessment of a region's institutional and cultural specificities. The
SDIs planners may have failed to properly understand the sources of local disadvantage in the
areas targeted for intervention, which lie not only in the absence of physical and human
capital but also - at least in part - in the character of the local social, cultural and institutional
arrangements.
4.1 .2 Growth, equiry, job creation andsustainable development
Officially, SDIs were primarily about promoting growth in areas with untapped potential,
particularly those areas that have the potential to contribute to a new, outward-orientation in
the South African economy:
The SDI strate!) assumes the advisabiliry of spatial tm;geting and a far-reaching
consequwce of this ta'1,etingfor international competitiveness is that economic development
will not necessariiy takeplace where people are concentrated, but rather where the aTTqy of
factors that determine international competitiveness are strongest... There is constant
pressurefor the selection ofSDIs to be politicised in the interests ofprovincial equiry orother
local constituendes. This poses the greatest threat to the future of the SDIs because, if
investors suspect that the process is moving awqy from sound economic principles, the kry
aspect ofinvestment 'crowding-in' willrapidfy be lost andthe whole strate!) willbe seriousfy
compromised.
(Jourdan etal, 1997: 3)
In this formulation, SDIs are "not necessarily" about redressing spatial inequalities. Indeed,
according to Jourdan et al, a focus on "provincial equity or other local constituencies" poses
the "greatest threat" to the integrity of the programme and there is thus a need to "vigorously
oppose" equity considerations in favour of "sound economic principles" when selecting areas
for SDI-style interventions. This "emphasis on areas of potential rather than need"
(Adebayo and Todes, 2003: 5) is characteristic of the view that SDIs were primarily about the
stimulation of growth and investment, and only secondarily about local linkages, poverty
alleviationand job creation.
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However, much of the literature stresses that the SDI programme seems an uneasy policy
blend seeking to combine improved economic efficiency and growth on the one hand with
spatial equity and redistribution on the other. Several writers have argued that - despite the
stated intentions of SDI officials - the extreme imbalances of the South African situation
inevitably inveigle their way into regional initiatives such as the SDI programme. Hall for
example points out that "the spatiality of the SDI policy reflects a recognition of the
profoundly unequal historical pattern of spatial development in South Africa" (1999: 7).
Platzky inserts the SDIs into a policy arena characterized as "economic growth with social
development" (my emphasis), (1998: 1). And Rogerson argues that the "broadened sectoral
focus of the SDI programme away from industry was admitted to be the result of political
pressures with the inclusion of agri-tourism specifically conceded as linked to issues of
poverty alleviation" (Rogerson, 1998: 189). Altman concurs: "The wide variety of SDIs is
partly explained by political pressure from each of the provinces" (2001: 26).
This view of the SDIs as a programme balancing growth anddevelopment is interrogated by
the most extensive analysis of an individual SDI produced to date. Soderbaum and Taylor's
book on the Maputo Development Corridor (tvIDC) questions the developmental agenda
claimed by some SDI planners and analysts (2004). Theirs is probably the most extreme
example of a widespread critique that views the SDls as little more than a "nee-liberal"
programme that abandons - or at the very least profoundly compromises - equity and
developmental impulses in favour of a rolling back of the state and helter-skelter privatisation.
In their analysis, the MDC becomes emblematic of the SDI programme in general, which is
viewed as little more than an anachronistic expression of an outdated "big-bang" approach
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s "but minus the guiding role of the state in mediating
between the interests of capital and labour and, in the contemporary world, between the
transnational and the national". Under the new orthodoxy (of which the SDIs are a prime
example), the state gives up its role as a mediating influence seeking to craft beneficial
partnerships that promote equity and development; rather it becomes an "investment
promotion agency" functioning as a "transmission belt for economic globalisation"
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(Soderbaum and Taylor, 2004: 49)9 in the naive hope that this will bring jobs and other
developmental spin-offs:
Thus, the SDIs programme is explicitlY connected toperceptions that in an era marked fry
globalisation, liberalforms ofmacro- and micro-regionalisation are a crudalmeans fry which
states mqy come together and tap into theglobalisation process in order to maximise their
pulling power with regard to international capital Though part of a wider regional and
global process, the SDIs in general and the MDC in particular, can thus be seen as
concerted attempts fry state-society elites to reconstitute micro-regional spaces along lines
favouring private enterprise, particularlY externally-orientedfractions ofcapital, with an rye
to theglobal market,
(Siiderbaum and Tqylor, 2004: 2)
9 Elsewhere, Soderbaurn and Taylor speak of the state "as the disciplining spokesman of global
economic forces" (2004:53), The stridency of their critique is also evident in the following passages:
The neo-liberalforces behind the Corridor's inception can onlY push forfurther priuatisation andthe rolling
back of state involvement. What we are suggesting here is that the state is in danger of being relegated to
becoming simplY a transmission beltfor transnational capital: Such strategies cast everything within a proftt-
seeking and 'bankable' framework, which allows very little space for tackling the social and ecological
implications thatthe variousprojects engender. (2004:49)
What is emeW'ng is not apartnership between state andcapital in the service of the public good, butrather a
deal between the political elite andtransnational capital, supported I!J the Intemational Financial Institutions
andthe donor communi!)', to rush headlong into liberalisation. .. In doing so, the pqy-rff ispredicated on the
belief that 'development' will inexorablY proceed growth - in short, 'trickle-down'theory. According to this
dominantparadigm, goodgovernance isdefined aslessgovemment. (2004:53)
Although the MDC is starounded I!J the rhetoric ofpeople-centred development, in reality the main concern is
itifrastmctural development through PPPs andthe encouragement ofprivate 'mega projects~ In e.ffect thispublic
govemance mechanism is simplY to boost new bankable and commercial!J viable investment projects, often of
giganticproportions, rather ensure localparticipation in design, poliff-making andimplementation. (2004: 73)
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In this perspective, the SDIs are "founded on a capital-intensive, big business and top-down
development strategy, with the real intention to increase export growth and gross domestic
product rather than people-centred development" (Soderbaum and Taylor, 2004: 49). The
emasculated state all but abandons the economic sphere, withdrawing from its role of actively
guiding the engagement between capital and labour or endogenous and foreign capital in
favour of a facilitatory role designed to pave the way for more efficient capital accumulation.
This abdication, the authors argue, is "totally inappropriate to the kind of investment the
region .. . needs" (2004: 50).
The main thrust of Soderbaum and Taylor's book is thus corrosive. Theirs is a nonnative
argument which develops a highly critical perspective of the SDI programme without offering
much in the way of positive prescription. They do argue consistendy for a more
interventionist state but their recommendations remain at the level of vague generalities. If
poverty alleviation and development are to accompany commercial private investment - if the
developmental reach of SDI-initiated economic activity is to stretch beyond national and
transnational capital - the state must retain "an active role" as mediator and regulator. It is
clear that they do not recommend a return to the earlier dirigiste stance of the Mozambican
state during its era of socialist experimentation, nor do they "willy-nilly dismiss private
investment within the initiatives currendy reconfiguring the region" (2004: 54). However,
what exacdy they mean by a more "active role" remains somewhat hazy. They argue for
"selective interventions" designed "to guide and harness the market to promote local, national
and regional developmental goals" and to ensure a more equitable outcome than the laissez
faire typical of the transmission belt scenario (2004:56). The following quote is perhaps the
closest they come to a set of precise recommendations:
Specific contractual obligations to involve local partners on the ground, partiCIIlarfy those
managed by and with a strong labour component comprisedofdisadvantaged persons, such




Soderbaum and Taylor's analysis is hampered by a number of shortcomings . In general, they
participate in what Ferial Haffajee recently called the "predictable arguments and sketchy
research" of South Africa's "new left". Haffajee's precis of this group's set piece goes like
this:
Teny ears on, the revolution's been sold down the riser: TheAf n'can NationalCongress is
neo-liberal shadow ofitsformer se!l- it hasimplementeda Tbatcherite economicpoliryand
lift its comrades outto dry asit hassupplicated before a wealtl!} coterie ofelites. (2004)
Moreover, Soderbaum and Taylor's critique remains mostly at the level of general assertion.
While littered with references to the shortcomings of the SDI programme, they provide very
little empirical evidence to support their analysis. Their work is also countered by others who
argue that, although the MDC did deliver capital intensive mega-projects, the programme also
gave serious attention to its developmental objectives, especially from 1997 onwards:
. . . since 1997 there were certain shifts in emphasis andptioti!) between ofvectives and
strategjes. . . Firstfy, asprogress was made with implementation ofthe core irfrastruaure and
economic developmentprojects (also referred to as the "mega-projects"),greater emphasis tuas
placed on .. the oijective .. to ensure that the development impact of this investment was
maximised, particularfy to disadvantaged communities. Underfying thisshiftinptioti!) was
an acceptance that these "mega-projects" were unlikefy toproduce large numbers oflow cost
jobs, or spontaneousfy (i. e. "trickle-down"} to promote large numbers of sustainable
entrepreneurial development opportunities.. .N either were such projects likefy to provide
opportunities for communi!) based empowerment projects. Within this context, greater
emphasis was placed on the identijication ofpotential pilot demonstration projects in the
agticulture, forestry and tourism sectors; small, micro and medium scale enterprise
detelopmentprogrammes; andlocal economicdeielopmen:
(De Beer andArkwtight, 2004: 21.)
This view is supported by others who have analysed the developmental impacts of the MDC
(cf. Adebayo and To des, 2003). While the mega-projects did indeed have very significant
growth impacts that clearly served the interests of "big capital", Soderbaum and Taylor's
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analysis almost certainly underestimates the efforts of the MDC to improve its developmental
reach even if the more developmental projects associated with the initiative were somewhat
disappointing.
Soderbaum and Taylor also have a tendency to generalise uncritically from discussions of the
MDC to the broader SDI programme. In their view, the MDC becomes emblematic of the
entire SDI progranlffie. This manoeuvre tends to elide the vast differences between the
various SDIs. In reality, the SDIs have ranged from large-scale, capital intensive projects to
rural, tourism-based initiatives, such as the Wild Coast SDI and the Lubombo SDI, that
involved smaller scale investment and a much greater focus on local linkages and poverty
alleviation. Even if one accepts Soderbaum and Taylor's view of the MDC (which I have
argued above is open to challenge), it is highly questionable whether their critique applies in
any generalised sense to the SDI progranlffie as a whole. The debate on the developmental
impacts of the SDIs needs to move away from general assertions rooted in critiques of private
sector-led investment strategies to a much more detailed examination of the various individual
cases, especially those that have invested considerable effort in the promotion of forms of
locallyintegrated economic development.
These critiques bring a valuable perspective to the SDI programme. It is widely admitted -
even by senior SDI practitioners - that the number of upstream and downstream linkages
stimulated by the SDI processes have generally been disappointing (De Beer et al, 2001).
Nevertheless, most SDIs - including the MDC - have committed significant resources to the
development of local linkages. The case of the Lubombo SDI will be discussed at length in
following chapters. But there are other cases where local development progranlffies have
been at the core of the SDI progranlffie. The Richards Bay SDI was, for example, predicated
on the need to diversify the local economy through improved linkages between the
established large-scale industries and the town's relatively underdeveloped small business and
service sectors .
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4.2 Governance and institutional issues
4.2.1 Limitedpublic resources and timeframes
The SDls were intended to be rapid interventions from the centre designed to by-pass slow
bureaucratic processes by injecting national expertise and resources into local contexts
characterised by weak human, institutional and financial capabilities. SDls thus operated as
higWy flexible "special agencies" able to access high level political support and "to link to a
range of stakeholders, to different levels of government, and to communities. They could
reach beyond existing local government, and even provincial and national boundaries"
(Adebayo and Todes, 2003: 39). This was particularly important in the early years after the
end of apartheid when local and provincial governments were being extensively reorganised
resulting in weak capacities at the local level, particularly in the peripheral areas where many
of the SDls operated.
Several writers have however pointed to the fact that - despite their "special agency" status
and their links to the centre - the SDls individually and collectively failed to commit
significant public resources in pursuit of their development agendas thus compromising their
ability to deliver on their ambitious aims. This may be pardy explained by the constraints
imposed by GEAR. "The implementation of the GEAR macro-economic policy limits the
public resources that may be applied to the SDls, and thus in part explains the aggressive
private investment orientation of the policy" (Hall, 1999: 8). Given its commitment to a
fiscally restrictive macro-economic policy, national government could not pledge large-scale
public resources to the promotion of regional interventions such as the SDI programme.
This is particularly limiting in contexts where individual SDls required heavy investment in
infrastructure to unlock underlying economic potentials but market conditions militated
against such delivery through partnerships with the private sector. The problem is of course
not limited to SDI programme. Amin argues that it generally afflicts contemporary regional
development interventions in the so-called less-favoured regions. This is particularly true in
the current era of monetary austerity:
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... something has to be done to secure the less-favoured regions su.fficient time andresources to
implement boot-strapping reforms. So entrenchedis .. state commitment to macro-economic
prudence - f rom monetary stabiliry to reducedpublicexpenditure - that manipulation ofthe
rules infavour oftheLFRs is a dim prospect. Forexample, inflationary ordeficit-inducing
expenditure programmes steered towards the lessfavoured regions are likelY to be blocked
(Assin, 1999: 376.)
Closely related to this point is the short time frame of the SDIs, which were conceived as
"short term, fast track" interventions. One of the axioms of the new regionalism - which,
like the SDIs , seeks to promote solutions based on the mobilization of local resources - is
that action has to be not only contextually relevant but also medium- to long-term (Amin,
1999, 375). Endogenous regional solutions thus require a longer-term horizon if they are to
shift development paths that are embedded in deep and locally specific institutional
structures. In this context, the short time frame envisaged for the SDIs provides an
insufficient horizon within which to engage local conditions and overcome socially '
entrenched impediments to economic renewal, especially in the historically neglected regions
targeted by some of the initiatives. TIlls may be considered another symptom of the
underestimation of the institutional challenges faced by regional development interventions,
which I have argued above afflicted the SDI programme in its planning and design stage.
Altman points to a second level at which national government allegedly failed to mobilise the
resources required to implement the SDI programme:
In a context offledgling local structures andweak provincialfinances, national Government
could provide useful injeaions of capital andfast-track processes. However, this would
require a prior decision !?y Covemment to spend on infrastructure and to put in place
political and bureaucraticprocesses that would enable this fast-tracking. N either of these
was done. . .
The kry decision-making processes at a national level that would have released resources,
were not reallY inplace. So, the [pro;cct managers} that were succesiful atgetting resources
for the key infrastructure projects, such as in Lubombo, were simplY highlY ski!lul at
'scavenging'jorfunds andgameringpolitical support at thenationalleve/.
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(Altman, 2001: 31)
This seems to imply that SDI delivery was not just constrained by the fiscally restrictive
approach of national macro-economic policy. Rather, delivery was also systemically
undermined by a failure of governance at the national level. Having launched a national
policy initiative with ambitious delivery targets, the sponsors in DTI and the other key
departments involved in the programme, seemed to have failed to secure the political,
bureaucratic and financial will required to implement the programme at the scale and in the
time frame envisaged. This failure was not only due to a lack of sufficient funding; it was also
the consequence of "weak integration between government departments, and the absence of
clear national strategy in certain areas" (Adebayo and Todes, 2003: 39).
This led to a "colossal waste of scarce professional energy" (Altman, 2001: 31) as individual
SDI teams lobbied for support and resources in the absence of clear commitments and
processes at the national level.
4.2.2 Micro/macro linkages
Another factor inhibiting the smooth implementation of the SDI programme may, in the first
instance, be located in South Africa's post-apartheid constitutional order which sets in place a
new framework for regional policies such as the SDI programme. Harrison argues that "the
principle of co-operative government, which affirms the integrity of each sphere of
government (i.e. national, provincial and local), but which also requires a level of co-operative
decision-making and co-ordination across these spheres, means that South Africa's regional
policy will mature through an elaborate process of experimentation, negotiation and multi-
lateral readjustment" (1998: 4). Further:
The Constitution. .. sets the scenefor a complex admixture oftop down regionalpoliry and
bottom-up regionalism in other areas ofpoliry ~ specifying that certain kry competencies
[such as the environment] are the concurrent responsibili(y of national and provincial
government (Hamson, 1998:5).
In distributing powers between the three spheres of government "the constitution has created
the possibilities for aggressive territorial competition at various spatial scales. .. Given that
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certain key regional development decisions have been moved into the inter-governmental
arena, the constitution forces national policy-makers to enter into relationships with local
agents" (Hall, 1999: 8).
The new - and unsetded - constitutional order thus creates the framework within which the
tension, often discussed in regional policy theory, between the national (or supranational) and
the regional (or local) levels - sometimes argued as a tension between regional policy and
regionalism - will play itself out. "Differences in regional implementation of the national
program reflect regional differences in the outcome of negotiation and bargaining processes
between national and local interests" (Selznik, 1984, quoted in Harrison, 1998: 4). According
to Harrison the key question in this regard "is whether there is an adequate institutional
mechanism to accommodate these differences and achieve the necessary compromise without
destructive conflict" (1998: 3).10 This shifts the analysis towards the institutional terrain
which I have argued above characterizes much of the recent regional development literature.
The problem was exacerbated during the early stages of the SDI programme when, as noted
above, local and provincial government was in a state of flux. SDIs often operated in a
context of weak (or non-existent) local government which complicated the development of
local linkages. On the other hand, their flexible "special agency" status allowed them to
facilitate interventions at the local level in a period when local level capacity was inadequate.
In addition, their location outside the established bureaucratic structures and line
responsibilities gave them an extraordinary degree of flexibility which sometimes enabled the
facilitation of greater integration between the various line departments and spheres of
government. I I
10 And Soderbaum argues the need for "a sound balance between centralised and decentralised policy-
making, which allows a certain degree of provincial and local participation at earlier stages in the
process" (2004: 73).
\I Adebayo and Todes have argued this point well:
In some respects the 'special agenry'joT771 ofSDIs was extremelYeffictive. Thry were able to link to a range
ofstakeholders, to diffirent levels ofgovernment, andto communities. Thry were also able topush through a
37
Much of the recent secondary literature on SDls has in fact dealt with this theme either
explicitly or by implication. While recognising the "special agency" gains of the SDls, much
of this literature argues, in one way or another, that the various SDls have largely failed in
their attempts to address Harrison's "key question". So for example, Soderbaum has argued
that the Maputo Development Corridor's (MDC) use of a "fluid, loosely structured and
informal network structure" (2001: 19) has seen the emergence of an innovative governance
mechanism, which has enhanced interdepartmental coordination and a flexible response to
local conditions. On the other hand, this "minimalist or even 'non-institutional' perspective"
(2001:12) - while allowing rapid design and decision-making - has proven problematic in
contexts of low institutional capacity (such as those in Mpumalanga and Mozambique) and a
time frame that dictates a short-term intervention from the centre.
The national-provincial relationship has ... proved to be a flaw in the design and
implementation ofthe MDC. Centralgovernment institutions have pushed the project, but
due to capaci!J constraints on the provincial and local level the assumed 'utgency' has left
these actors outside ofa'!Y real design andimplementation.
(Siiderbaum, 2004:69.)
In practice, this has meant that the MDC has failed to embed itself institutionally at the
regional /provincial level with grave consequences for its ultimate success'".
EssentiallY the MDC has been designed at the drawing tables of Gauteng and quicklY
enforced in a top-down manner, without ensuring that provincial and local actors are
integratedandconsulted orthatit can workfOr the people living in the corridor area.
range ofdevelopment pro/ects, andto move with changing conditions. Tbey could operate beyond existing local
govemment, andeven provincial andnational boundaries.
(2003: 39).
12 "Instead of a multiplier effect and a kick-start, a fast-tracked SDI faces the risk of being yet another




Others have argued that the "failure" of the MDC to embed locally was not so much a result
of its failure to "consult" at the local and provincial levels but rather the consequence of
technical and financial capacity constraints at the provincial level and the loss of political
support in the province at a crucial time. The latter had less to do with the lack of a
participatory process and more with the succession cycle in the province (as leadership passed
from a pro-MDC to an anti-MDC premier) which saw a collapse of political support for the
programme in the province. Its "failure" was thus not so much that it was an imposition from
above, but that it depended on particular local conditions, and once these changed, things fell
apart. (SeeDe Beer and Arkwright, 2004, and Adebayo and Todes, 2003.)
Others, including Bek and Taylor (2001) and Kepe et al (2001), have made similar claims for
the West Coast Investment Initiative (WCll) and the Wild Coast SDI. Broadly, the argument
is that these SDls involve top-down programmes driven from the centre that have largely
failed to integrate productively with local conditions.
One of the most thoughtful of the recent SDI analyses has come from Hall (1999). His
argument has not so much been that the SDls have failed to embed locally; rather, "SDI
policy has been constrained by regional institutional dynamics operating in the places where
the policy is to be implemented" (1993:3). Hall thus brings an explicitly institutionalist
perspective to his analysis of the SDls in general and the Richards Bay SDI in particular.
In Hall's (1999) view, "existing regional institutional structure acts as a filtering mechanism
that shapes the local implementation of SDI policy". In the absence of careful attention to
regional institutional structure, SDI-style interventions are likely either to be resisted or "to
reinforce existing, and problematic, development trajectories" (1999:3). The burden of his
paper is to demonstrate the latter point in relation to the Richards Bay SDI where he argues
SDI policy has failed to fundamentally shift the town's institutional structure and its
associated development path. "Richards Bay, as a growth pole, has grown on the basis of
inward investment of large manufacturing concerns and infrastructural investment" (1999:
14). This has meant that the town's economy, while growing rapidly since its inception, has
considerable structural problems; it is "dominated by a few low value-adding large firms
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which offer limited employment opportunities and limited backward and forward linkages
[Lewis and Bloch, 1997], while the small firm sector is undeveloped" (1999:10) . This
structure is underpinned by close relationships between the port authority, key sectors of local
industry and local government all of whom have an interest in precluding "development
forms that require other 'inputs', or a different institutional environment" (1999:14):
lV'hat the institutional analysis highlights is that the ability of local actors to capture
resources of national govemment andparastatal agencies, to seek and attract investors, to
efficientfy and rapidfy develop land, andprovide certain well-ron infrastrocture is not the
problem. (1993: 14.)
The problem is that the SDI program reflects, rather than challenges, the institutional
struaure of the region and thus the decision frameworks of agents. Put simpfy, the SDI
program curmltfy does not contribute to substantial economic diversification, the creation of
an entrepreneurial and innovative climate, a shift in the operating environment for small
businesses, the development ofa new skills base, orthe strengthening ofrural-urban economic
linkages. (1993:15)
This is a very different proposition to that made by Soderbaum and Taylor (2004). In the
case of Richards Bay - due to the peculiar circumstances of that "growth pole" - local
conditions have shaped the outcome of the SDI intervention causing it to reinforce rather
than shift the existing development trajectory. Nevertheless, the argument remains that the
SDI intervention failed to mediate productively between local and national interests. Again,
the SDI proved an inadequate institutional mechanism (to adapt Harrison's phrase), but here
the top-down hierarchy was reversed. At Richards Bay, it was not the failure to involve
"bottom-up forces" and facilitate local participation that was the problem. It was rather the
cohesion and durability of the local institutional networks - including local government - that
effectively reworked the central intervention into a reinforcement of local development
patterns. Here it was therefore not the "top" forcing through a development agenda with no
regard to the local citizenry and institutional landscape but the ''bottom'' effectively resisting,
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or reconfiguring, an interventionist push from the centre.l' According to Hall, the Richards
Bay SDI failed to address the "endurability and framing influence" (Amin, 1999:367) of
existing institutional structure and therefore failed to significantly alter the town's economic
trajectory.
5. Conclusion
TIlls chapter examined the SDI programme against the background of recent regional policy
development. It emphasised the "institutionalist tum" in the regional development literature,
particularly the emphasis this writing brings to endogenous growth solutions and institutional
issues. Key institutionalist axioms were noted, especially the idea that regional development
solutions have to be context-specific and sensitive to local path-dependencies (Amin, 1999:
368). Against this background, the chapter surveyed the South African SDI programme
noting its affinity with the "new regionalism" described above. This includes the
programme's emphasis on region-specific interventions as well as its efforts to upgrade the
supply-based of the targeted regions.
However, much of the literature surveyed in the chapter argues that the SDls have, in general,
had limited developmental impacts. The scale of their delivery as well as the developmental
reach of initiatives such as the MDC have - despite strenuous efforts - been somewhat
disappointing, especially when measured against the ambitious claims made during the
programme's early days.
A closely related theme in the SDI literature is the idea that some of the initiatives - despite
the gains of their "special agency" approach - seemed not to have developed "adequate"
institutional responses to the specific conditions they faced in their various localities. They
failed to "embed" thems elves at the local and provincial levels, which meant that they could
not mediate productively between national, provincial and local interests . This resulted in
13 Of course, as in the MDC, the Richards Bay SDI essentially served the interest of "mega-capital".
The difference being that in the case of the latter, the local landscape was already dominated by big
firms and their allies in government and the parastatal agencies.
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little local grounding (such as in the case of the Maputo Development Corridor) or, where
local institutional cohesion was strong, in the reinforcement of existing development
trajectories (such as in the case of the Richards Bay SDI).
These "failings" seem to be due to a number of factors, including an underestimation of the
constraints - including institutional factors - operative at the local level, especially in the
historically neglected areas targeted by some of the SDIs. Given the very considerable
impediments operative at the local level, individual SDI interventions were compromised by
short time frames, limited financial resources and lack of sustained political support, especially
from the centre. In this sense, the SDI programme contradicted one of the key institutionalist
principles which argues that regional interventions designed to shift the development
fundamentals require both long-term horizons as well as sustained political and fiscal support
(see Amin, 1999,375 -376). IfSDIs such as the MDC were to be devolved to the local leve1
and spread their developmental reach, they required longer time frames, greater resources and
deeper political support. In the words of Paul Jourdan: "If an SDI is to succeed it needs to be
driven from a level that can bring all the requisite resources to bear to create .. . an enabling
environment" (Iourdan, 2004). Given that the stated intention was indeed to devolve the
programme, it would seem that not enough resources - temporal, financial and political -
were made available to root this devolution in local conditions and make it jeffective over the
long term,
The limited developmental impacts and the difficulties encountered by various individual
SDIs in developing an adequate institutional response to local conditions provide the
background to the discussion of the Lubombo SDI in the following chapter. It examines the
Lubombo SDI as a specific case to test and expand the generic discussion - including the






This chapter builds on the previous discussion of the regional development literature and the
SDr programme by examining how an individual initiative - the Lubombo SDr - conceived
nationally but designed to intervene regionally operates under conditions shaped by factors
such as systemic underdevelopment, acute institutional deficits, wide-ranging infrastructural
shortages, and a history of political and social conflict."
The region targeted by the Lubombo SDI has suffered a long history of neglect and
economic stagnation. Not only does it face severe shortages in physical infrastructure but
also certain institutional characteristics that have contributed to long term economic decline
in the region. The chapter will refer to the multiple tensions between and within
conservationist groups, local communities, tribal groups, political parties and levels of
government which have locked the area into a low growth development path.
The Lubombo SDr emerged in a post-1994 arena, which was characterised, on the one hand,
by institutional transition at the local and provincial levels and, on the other hand, by tensions
between the principal political parties. Frikkie Brooks, Acting Deputy Director-General:
Department of Traditional Affairs and Local Government, KwaZulu-Natal, describes the
transitional context in which the SDr operated as follows:
14 The Lubombo SDl was a trilateral initiative involving the governments of South Africa,
Mozambique and Swaziland. The focus in this chapter is however mainly on the South African
component, where the programme has progressed farthest. The transnational aspects of the
initiative are briefly sketched where relevant but are not described in any detail. A broader
assessment, which more fully describes the history of the initiative in Mozambique and Swaziland, is
important but falls beyond the scope of the current study.
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.. . it is ofparticular significance tonote thatprogress made with the SDI andthe GSLlf7P
was achieved duting a complicated national, provincial and local transformation phase,
duting which time new policies were developing and institutions transformed. New
relationships hadtobe forged at difficult times. (Brooks, 2004.)
Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to illustrate that the Lubombo SDI (and the GSLWP Authority)
were to able to use these circumstances to create the political and institutional "space" it
required to implement its mandate. At the institutional level, the flux in local and provincial
government after 1994 meant that the SDI could use its "special agency" to reach into the
local arena and rapidly advance its agenda. At the provincial level in particular, the merging of
the old KwaZulu and Natal institutions - especially the conservation agencies of the former
KwaZulu and Natal apparatuses - with the attendant disruption and uncertainty of transition
also provided manoeuvring space for the SDI.
Politically, the period was characterised by complex tensions between the IFP and the ANC
at the local, provincial and national levels. Again, the chapter will attempt to show that the
SDI was able to use this dynamic to advance implementation. So, for example, the
momentum created by the delivery of infrastructure and other "flagship projects" as well as
the high level reconciliation between the two principal political parties in the mid- and late-
nineties meant that the SDI could build and maintain visible bilateral support for the
Lubombo project at the highest level. This in tum could be used to defuse opposition from
gate keepers and detracting political forces at the local and provincial levels. In short, the
chapter argues that the institutional and political conjuncture in the latter half of the nineties
provided the space that the SDI needed to advance its programme.
From the outset, the Lubombo SDI believed that delivery in an area afflicted by extreme
poverty, infrastructure deficits and economic stagnation, had to be shaped not only by the
grand logic of the SDI but also by the other priorities ofgovernment as well as the immediate
social and economic needs of the area's inhabitants . This required a "framework" rather than
a "blueprint" approach that allowed the SDI sufficient flexibility to align the delivery of the
prioritised interventions with local interests and government's broader social agenda. In this
sense, the Lubombo SDI actively "mediated" between national interests as embodied in the
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SDI objectives with local priorities. Programmes such as the building of roads or the control
of malaria thus provided opportunities to pull together a range of actors into co-operative
ventures that showed the complementarity of national and local objectives. These
programmes demonstrated that national, provincial and local interests were not necessarily in
conflict. It was possible to simultaneously deliver immediate benefits to rural residents and
improve conditions for longer term economic efficiency. But they also required careful
management to ensure that the conflicting agendas of the various actors did not paralyse
delivery. A flexible approach was needed that engaged different stakeholders differently
based on their interests but without jeopardising the strategic thrust of the programme.
It is beyond scope of the current study to map this process in any great detail. Instead,
Chapter 3 starts by providing a brief overview of the background to the Lubombo initiative,
particularly the land use debates and the associated mining controversy of the late-1980s and
early-1990s as well the entrenchment of a "low-road" development trajectory which saw the
stagnation of the northern KwaZulu-Natal economy during the latter decades of the last
century. It stresses that the underdevelopment of Maputaland was entrenched not only by
the lack of physical infrastructure but also by multiple tensions between various social actors.
Thereafter, the focus shifts to a review of the Lubombo experience. First, the early history of
the Lubombo SDI, its underpinning analysis and its institutional structure are sketched. After
this, the suite of interventions promoted by the Lubombo SDI during the first phase of its
implementation are described. These were designed to lay the basis for a broad-based
improvement in the region's development fundamentals. They included "classic" SDI-style
interventions such as key infrastructure delivery but also a range of other longer-term
measures intended to shift the region's development prospects onto a higher plane. In a
region characterised by stagnation, it was considered particularly important to establish a track
record of delivery to build momentum and new networks. This process is illustrated in the
discussion of the infrastructure and malaria eradication programmes implemented under the
banner of the Lubombo SDI.
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2. The roots of the Lubombo SDr
2.1 The mining controversy
The roots of the Lubombo SDr lie, in the first instance, in one of the most significant and
publicized debates on land use options and environmental values ever to have taken place in
South Africa. The forested dunes that run the length of Maputaland's eastern coast are rich in
ilmenite (titanium ore). Further south, in the vicinity of Richards Bay, these deposits are
mined commercially by Richards Bay Minerals ("RBM"), the largest single producer of
titanium products in the world". In 1989, as part of a major expansion drive, the company
applied for authorization to mine deposits along the eastern littoral of Lake St Lucial 6.
Conservationists, various public lobbying groups and, to a lesser extent, some resident
communities viewed the prospect of dredge mining at St Lucia as a serious threat to the
conservation of the area's biodiversity, its splendid landscapes, its special "sense of place" and
15 Richards Bay Minerals is jointly owned by Billiton Plc and Rio Tinto, two of the largest mining
houses in the world. RBM is one of the largest stand-alone mining operations in SA.
(http://www.mbendi.co.za/orgs/efq8.htm.).
For 20 years RBM has mined the dunes along the northern Kwa Zulu-Natal coast, extracting heavy
mineral concentrates from the sands and then rehabilitating the dunes. The four mining plants are
split between two lease areas - the 17km x 2 km Tisand leasearea and the larger 20 km x 2 km Zulti
north area.RBM now accounts for about 25% of world output of titanium feedstocks (titania slag
and rutile), 33% of world zircon output and 25% of high purity pig iron. RBM is SA's major source
of high-quality pig iron. Only 10% of RBM's pig iron is sold locally; the balance is exported
worldwide. (http://www.mbendi.co.za/orgs/efq8.htm.).
16 In 1977, RBM began with one dredge mining plant and two furnaces, producing 400 000 t/year of
titania slag. In 1986 an extra furnace and mining plant were added, raising production to 750
OOOt/year. The largest major investments in capacity expansion was in the early 1990s, when a
fourth furnace and mining plant were installed at a cost of R1,2bn, lifting RBM's titania slagcapacity
to 1Mt/year and its pig iron production to 550000 t/year.
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its potential to support a world-class tourism product." The debate became very heated and
the South African government was eventually forced to intervene to resolve the dispute . An
environmental impact assessment was undertaken and an independent Review Panel (chaired
by a judge of the Supreme Court) appointed to review the outcome and hold public hearings.
The Review Panel concluded that no mining should be allowed in the greater St Lucia area on
the basis that the ecosystem is a "strategic environmental asset" recognised internationally as
having exceptional conservation values". The Review Panel recommended many of the





St Lucia was an asset of international importance that should be afforded World Heritage
status;
The complexity of the issues facing St Lucia required intervention via a dedicated national
act and independent authority;
St Lucia should be a "people's park" that contributed to poverty eradication and social
development.
Restitution for local communities removed from the area should ensure that
Those who have historic connections with the area, those local communities who live in the
area and those who have been displaced from the area, have a signijicant role in the
management and operation of the area and derive direct economic and other benefits
therefrom.
(Review Panel Report, 1993).
17 By the early-nineties, half a million citizens had signed a no-mining petition including such
luminaries as Nelson Mandelaand MangosuthuButhelezi.
18 It was noted in the Review Panel's report that the impoverishedcommunities neighbouring the park
were overwhelmingly in support of mining. Although expressing a high respect for nature, these
communities perceived the St Lucia wetlands, ecotourism and the area's management authority (the
Natal Parks Board) in a very negative way.
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After lengthy debate, the National Cabinet confinned the no-mining conclusion in 1996 but
stressed that its decision was based on an economic argument that conservation-based
tourism should be integrated with other land uses to generate regional and national economic
benefits in the same order as the mining option. In a joint statement, the Ministers of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism; Land Affairs; Mineral and Energy Affairs; Water Affairs
and Forestry; and Arts, Culture, Science and Technology set out the Cabinet's decision and its
vision for the future of the greater St Lucia area. Together with the recommendations of the
Review Panel this statement, in many ways, sets the scene for the Lubombo SDI:
The Cabinet decided that no mining willbe allowed on the Eastern Shores ofthe St Lscia
System in KwaZulu-NataL
The Cabinet also decided in favour of an integrated development and land-use planning
strateg; for the Eastern Shores and the entire Greater St Lsaia region. This will enable
various sectors (such as nature conservation, agriCIIlture, ecotoutism, forestry and existing
mining) to work collectivefy towards the common goal oferadicating the region's poverty and
thus promoting sustainable development, It was also decided that 011 application to register
St Ulcia asa lJ70rld Heritage Site wouldgoahead uTJ,entfy.
The Cabinetfelt thata decision onmining on the Eastern Shores could no longer be delayed.
The uncertainty hada detrimental ejftct on development, The Cabinet also took the view
that mining on these shores and development of tourism were not compatible. The great
tourism potential ofthe region can now befulfy exploited
A task team under the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism including
NationalMinisters andProvincial representation willco-ordinate the development ofa land-
use strategyfor the Greater St Luaa area,
(Government ofSouth Africa, 1999).
Many of the elements later incorporated into the Lubombo SDI are prefigured in this
statement. It talks of the need to develop "an integrated land-use strategy" for the greater St
Lucia area with "the common goal of eradicating the region's poverty and thus promoting
sustainable development." It also talks of the "great tourism potential" of the region, which
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"can now be fully exploited". In stressing these elements, Cabinet was, in effect, setting the
agenda for what was later to be called the Lubombo SDI.
The mining controversy and its resolution also foreshadowed the Lubombo SDI in another
sense. It illustrated the complex tensions between key social actors - including
conservationists (inside and outside the state), various government departments, big business
and local communities - over the use of a major natural resource, and the need for a decisive
state-driven intervention to break the deadlock and advance the region's development agenda.
2.2 "Poverty amidst plenty"
The decision to close down the mining option along the far northern coast of KwaZulu-Natal
was taken against the background of economic stagnation and extreme socio-economic need
in the region. In 1998, a study commissioned by the Lubombo SDI described the situation as
follows:
The South Africanportion of the Lubombo SDI hasa population ofapproximatelY 500
000 andis one of thepoorest areas in South Africa. It hasone of the greatest pove,,!] gap
leoels, as well as some of the lowest literary levels and highest unemplqyment levels in
KwaZulu-NataL
Some 90% ofmral households earn incomes of less than R800 per month. The region has
the province's highest backlogs in housing, social infrastmcture andcommuni!}facilities.
(l....ubombo SDI, 1998a: 33).
The exceptional biodiversity of the area had long made it a target for conservationists. But
until the 1990s, conservation efforts in the area generally worked to exacerbate the plight of
rural residents rather than contribute to economic growth and poverty alleviation:
The development ofthe {greater St Lucia area} has been inhibited fry matryfactors, matry of
,vhich are rooted in the political economy ofSouth Africa's apartheidpast. For example,
under the previous dispensation, large tracts ofrural landwere given over to thefotmation of
nature reserues managed fry committed state agencies that ensured a high level of
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environmentalpreseruation within theprotected areas. Outside the nature reserves, however,
land deprivation andsystematicunderdevelopment caused setere levelsofresource degradation
andacute poverry among large sectors of the population. This co-existence between protected
nature reserves on the one handand degradedhuman reserves onthe other,fows the broad
context that hasdeterminedtheunderdevelopment oftheGSLWP.
(Lubombo SDI, 2000b: 82)
This view is underlined in a study on the history of conservation and removals in Maputaland,
the Association for Rural Advancement found :
The history of conseruation in Maputaland this century has been aft unhappy one for ma'!Y
of the localpeople. In general, conseruation in the region has led toforced removals, the
threat offorced removals, material loss through inadequate compensation, and consequent
social dislocation. A s the Centrefor Communi!} Organisation, Research and Development
has recentlY claimed: 'Relocation out ofareasproclaimedunderconservation legislation, has
underminedthe survivalofthose [people]movedto areas which deprive themofaccess to the
natural resources tbey relY onfor theirlivelihood ' This source also maintains that 30% of
thepeople ofMaputalandhave been removedat least oncein theirlifetime. . .
(AFRA, 1990: 5).
This tension between local impoverished residents and conservationists constitutes an
important source of social and political tension in the Maputaland and may, as such, be
considered a key feature of the region's institutional landscape.19 This tension has its roots in
19 TIle following quotation from Sikhumbuzo Gumede, a community leader and activist in
Maputaland, illustrates the deep mistrust with which many Maputaland residents view cons ervation:
The conservation domain hasforma'!Yyears remained an "Island" which perpetuallY excluded the local
indigenouspeoplefrom decision making. Perhaps, the mentali!y of the Nationalistgovemment which
originatedf rom thefirstmissionaries that African / Black people were at Inteligence zero stillpersist in
the conservation circles. The originalperception was thatAfrica was vacant. Theperception continued,
Af ricans/ Blackswere onlY intelligent when thry had acquired andparticipated in iuestem wqys ofIzJe
(civiliifltion). Ifi17J1IY believethat amseruationhaslargelY been influenced'?Y the aboverotten belief Very
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the colonial period but has been carried into the contemporary period. The African biologist
Richard Bell succinctly describes the situation that afflicts Maputaland:
. . .the institutional nature ifconservation was established during the colonialperiod; it has
strongpaternalistic and racist elementsto it, and is itselfa largepart iftheproblem. What
has happened is that control ifnatural resources has been progressivelY taeen awqy from
rural communities fry centralgovernment bureaucracies, and the bet/eftts flowing from them
have also been progressivelY concentrated in national treasuries. In iffect, a wall has been
erected between rural communities and the resources among which thry live. (Be/I, 1989,
quotedin Universi!J ifCape Town, 1990: 2.)
At the time of the mining controversy, the already marginalized Lubombo region was thus
mired in a deepening socio-economic crisis, which was partly rooted in deep social divisions
such as those sketched above between conservationists and local residents. The mid-nineties
actually saw a negative growth rate in regional tourism around the GSL\xrP. Despite robust
growth in the South African tourism sector after the end of apartheid, data from the
KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Service", as it was then known, showed steadily
Jew, if a'!Y of these institutions andstrictures have effectivelY embarked on a mission to dealwith the
fundamental issues of capacitating the people with the legislativeframework as it relates to their land
rights and other issues. The Island mentality coupled with the missionary beliej ahs signijicantIY
itifluenced onginal conservation struauns andthinking. As indicated, issues (communi!]) remain the
same; the onlY difference is the change in the legislativeframework which is not entirelY understood l!J
localpeople. Thatis wl!J thefundamental issues of1980 j- are stillbeing dealt with todqy l!J same people
andcommuni!] stnatures. Thepeople stillJeel that their land (thought it is legallY proclaimed) is still
being usedfor wrong reasons which has noty ielded a'!Y benefits to them andthry are being depnied of
their constitutional legitimate right to land The Land Claims struaut» has not dealt with thisproblem
andthryhaveneithermechanism norframework toaddress thisfundamental question.
(Gumede, 2004).
20 The KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Service (sometimes referred to as NCS) was the successor
to the Natal Parks Board (the conservation agency of the old province of Natal) and the
Department of Nature Conservation of the former bantustan of Kwazulu Natal). It subsequently
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declining occupancies in the region (Lubombo SDI, 2000: 65-66). Not only were occupancies
at existing facilities declining, but a 1996-survey identified at least 23 new major tourism
projects, which had the potential to diversify the tourism product of the region, stalled by a
maze of red tape, bureaucracy and local dynamics (Lubombo SDI, 1998a: 29). The 220km-
long GSL\W, which is one-third the length of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, in fact
continued to sustain fewer than 350 direct jobs in tourism.
The conclusions of a report on development prospects in Maputaland prepared in the late-
eighties remained valid a decade later:
. .. the present situation . . . is bedevilled fry conflicting policies, lack of co-ordination,
inadequate means of implementation, insuJficientfunds anda severe shortage ofmanpower.
. .. The status quo for Maputaland and its people thus represents a progressivelY
deteriorating situation. (Vandeoerre, etal. 1988: ii).
At the time of the Lubombo SDI's launch, it was clear that the area targeted by the initiative,
or at least its South African component, had become trapped in a ''low road" development
scenario with little prospect of economic regeneration. This became known as the "poverty
amidst plenty" paradox" : a poverty stricken human population living amidst an abundance of
natural wealth. The region thus exhibited the typical characteristics of a "less favoured region"
(LFR) described in the work of, amongst others, Amin (1999) and Morgan (1997). Not only
did it suffer from debilitating shortages in physical infrastructure but also a set of social - or
institutional - characteristics that locked it into long term economic stagnation. It was into
this situation that the Lubombo SDI stepped when it was launched in the mid-nineties .
changed its name and is now known as Ezemvelo KZN Wtldlife and is often referred to as simply
KZN Wtldlife.
21 TIlls was first formulated in the speech delivered by President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique in
his opening address at the launch of the Lubombo SDI (see below). It was subsequently quoted in
numerous documents related to the SDI.
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3. The planning phase
3.1 The Lubombo Framework
The Lubombo region was initially identified as a potential SDI during the broader "scoping"
exercise undertaken by the Departments of Transport, and Trade and Industry in early 1996.
By the middle of that year, an initial investigation had defined the geographic region to be
targeted and a strategy document setting out the principal elements of the initiative
completed.
On 17 October 1996, at a high level meeting between the governments of Swaziland,
Mozambique and South Africa, a framework agreement was signed setting in place the basic
parameters of the SDI as a trilateral programme involving the three neighbouring countries:
This[Framework} aims to address the massive poverty andsetvice backlogsfacing the area
by unlocking the stifled economicpotential ofthe reion through strateic intervention.
The initiative intends to provide an enabling environment for prioate sector investment
particularlY in the agricultural and tourist industries. The development ofprivate/public
partnerships in the provision ofinfrastructure is also to be considered.
(Zaloumis andDreyer, 1996:2).
The agreement recorded several undertakings of the three participating countries including
the drafting and implementation of various transnational regulatory frameworks - including
border control and access, conservation, infrastructure and disease control - intended to
enable socio-economic development consistent with the Lubombo SDI's objectives. It also
established a trilateral Ministerial Committee (comprised of the responsible ministers of the
three governments) to implement the Lubombo SDI and a trilateral Task Team to advise and
support the Ministerial Committee and assist in the implementation of its decisions. Each
country also established its own SDI management structure . In South Africa, this was crafted
to ensure a high level of co-ordination and political buy-in. It involved the establishment of a
steering committee comprising key national and provincial ministers and an SDI
management team that received funding and had direct access to the steering committee (and,
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from there, to cabinet) as well as individual line ministers and senior officials such as Director
Generals. It also included the creation of several national/provincial working groups for key
sectors and a KwaZulu-Natal provincial steering committee. A national SDI co-ordinating
committee (OSDIC) further supported the process.
The importance of political management was already evident in the composition of the South
African delegation to the SDI signing ceremony. It included the Minister of Trade and
Industry (Mr Alec Irwin), the Minister of Home Affairs (Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi), the
Minister of Transport (Mr Mac Maharaj), the MEC for Economic Affairs and Tourism in
KwaZulu-Natal (Mr Jacob Zuma) and the MEC for Finance in KwaZulu-Natal (Mr Ben
Ngubane). The composition of this group was not coincidental. It was carefully structured to
include not only a mix of senior national and provincial representatives but also of African
National Congress ("ANC") and Inkata Freedom Party ("IFP") politicians. This would be a
crucial component of the SDI's strategy throughout its early years: in order to drive through
its programme it required high level political patrons that could bridge the national/provincial
divide. This was particularly important in the context of KwaZulu-Natal where the province
was controlled by the IFP and where there was always a threat that the initiative could
become victim to the larger tensions between the ANC and the IFP. To maintain high level
and bipartisan political support, the SDI management invested much time in maintaining
close relations at the various political levels. It meant building strong relationships with the
key political sponsors. But it also meant an ongoing series of briefings not only to the
national cabinet and its various committees, but also to the provincial executive and to
various joint meetings of the executive and the amakhosi.
The Lubombo SDI thus recognised from an early stage that a regional development
intervention in an area characterised by social and political tension required special
management. In this sense, it recognised that the success of the initiative was crucially
dependent on the manner in which it engaged and managed the various political and social
networks that impacted on development in the region.
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3.2 The early logic
The briefing document prepared for the occasion of the framework signing - and the booklet
distributed at the launch of the Lubombo SDI two years later - clearly spelt out the
underlying logic of the initiative. Unlike most other initiatives, however, the Lubombo SDI
did not at the outset develop a detailed plan to direct its implementation. Instead, the early
documents set in place a framework approved by the relevant ministers that provided
guidance based on a high level strategic analysis. This would be the approach throughout the
Lubombo SDI. It allowed the initiative significant flexibility in aligning its key interventions
with government's broad range of priorities including not only investment promotion but also
other key commitments including job creation, black economic empowerment, health and the
delivery of social infrastructure. This alignment greatly facilitated the raising of funds for the
SDI's key interventions.
Like most SDIs, the regional focus of the Lubombo SDI was loosely defined. The initiative
would focus on the eastern regions of Swaziland, the southern part of Mozambique's Maputo
province and the north-eastern areas ofKwaZulu-Natal
The area extendsfrom the Umftlo~ River near Richards Bay northwards along the coastal
plain to the capital ciry, Maputo, on the Mozambican coast. It then stretches west to the
Lubombo Mountains, eastern 5wa~/and and the surrounding lowlands which run from
north tosouth through all these countries.
(Lubombo SDI, 1998a:5).
The documents then apply an analysis in the classic sense defined by the lead SDI
practitioners such as Jourdan (see Chapter 2 above). The Lubombo region is described as an
area of inherent, but under-utilized, economic potential . It has "an exceptional range of
natural and cultural resources, of national and international significance" which potentially
underpin the development of a new regional and international tourist destination with an
iconic status "alongside the Kruger National Park and Victoria Falls". Moreover, the region
is well watered by a number of major rivers and a series of natural and built reservoirs. It also
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contains a significant portion of South Africa's remaining undeveloped high potential
agricultural land:
A wide range of lucrative ecologicallY adapted crops can be grown. For example, the
Makhatini Flats (below the Joiini Dam) haspotentiallY JO OOOha ofirrigable land andis
South Africa's onlY tropical climatic region. If/ith a temperature range ofJoe - 48°efruits
ripen two weeks before those in the Mpumalanga Province.
(Zaloumis andDreyer, 1996:4).
The mix of assets in the Lubombo region is thus "well placed to stimulate internationally
competitive tourism and agricultural industries" (Lubombo SDI, 1998: 5).
The area's "recognised high development potential and clear competitive advantages" have
however been stifled by a variety factors. Like most other SDls, these constraints were, in the
first instance, perceived to be infrastructural in nature:
The inadequacy of road infrastructure is a mojor reason for the minimal tourism and
agricultural development in the region. Apartfrom the N2, which links Richards Bqy with
Swaiiland and Mpumalanga province, there are onlY minor and often untarred roads
running through the area.
(Utbombo SDI, 1998a: 5).
From the start, however, the designers of the Lubombo SDI took a broader view of the
factors inhibiting development in the region. Land was recognised as "a major issue of
contestation and a major barrier to development" (Zaloumis and Dreyer, 1996: 6), particularly
the legacies of apartheid which rendered tenure on communal land insecure and gave rise to
complex, and often overlapping, land restitution claims.
A further inhibitor of development was the protectionist approach of the current
conservation agencies:
Numerous sites in the region are internationally recognised and therefore protected I?J the
abili!J ofinternational environmentallobl?J groups. Environmental concerns andrestrictive
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amseruation poliry have been seen to be stalling eco-tourism developmC11t. However, these
very concerns and policies have protected and maintained the region 's clear comparative
natural advantages. Trade-offs which reeognise prioriry conseruation areas and the
developing ojhigh tourism andagriCIIlture potential mqy need to be made.
(Zaloumis andDreyer, 1996: 6).
The idea that a protectionist ethic, embedded in various environmental lobby groups as well
as the provincial conservation agency, was an inhibitor of economic growth would later
become a central plank in the SDI's approach. As stressed in the quotation above, this was
not viewed as a simple choice between alternatives. Even in its earliest documents, the SDI
argued in favour of a balanced approach between conservation and development that would
see a strategic "trade-off between conservation, tourism and agriculture. Nevertheless, the
recognition that "restrictive conservation policy" was perceived as a constraint to
development, indicates the seriousness with which the SDI viewed institutional impediments.
This question will be further explored in the next chapter when the establishment of the
GSLWP Authority is discussed at some length.
The early documents also show a clear recognition of the institutional complexities faced by
the SDI. Not only did the SDr have to negotiate political support that spanned the
national/provincial and party-political divides, it also faced huge complexity at the local level:
Non-govemmentalorganisations andcommuniry-based organisations are dispersed, andlocal
govemment weak. All are poorlY resourted. There is a lack ojeo-ordination between them
andoften contestation.
(Za/oumis andDreyer; 1996: 6).
This is an early statement of what was to become one of the SDI's key challenges.
Cutting across, and reinforcing all the constraints to development, was the sheer extent of
social and developmental neglect in the Lubombo region. At the outset, the SDr planners
recognised that the greatest threat to the development potential of the area was in fact the
extreme, and deepening, poverty of most of its inhabitants:
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The consequences ofpoverty and unsustainable development initiatives are likelY to destroy
the regjon's ... comparative natural advantages and negativelY impact on the socio-economic
fabric.
(Zaloumis andDreyer, 1996: 4).
This perspective recognises that conservation and development are closely linked in a
relationship of mutual interdependence. The development of the region depended on the
conservation of its natural resources (which underpin its economic potential); likewise, the
continued conservation of the region's superlative biodiversity assets depended on the
development of its people.
3.3 Launching the SDI
Having pinpointed the undeveloped potential of the Lubombo region and identified the
major factors constraining its realisation, the SDI planners then took the next step prescribed
by the SDI methodology: They identified and appraised a number of potential investment
opportunities. The tourism and agriculture sectors were prioritised and a number of lead
projects, thought to have the potential to significantly alter the development path of the
region, were identified. At the official launch of the SDI in 1998, these projects included
four tourism "clusters" or nodes. Three had a transboundary focus: an integrated
development spanning the Mozambique/South Africa boundary at Kosi Bay/Ponta do Ouro;
another focused around the Mlawula and Hlane reserves in north-eastern Swaziland and the
neighbouring Libombo Pequenos in Mozambique; and a third "transfrontier complex"
centred on the Jozini Dam and linking Lavumisa in south-eastern Swaziland with Pongola
and Jozini in South Africa. The fourth project fell squarely within the South African
component of the SDI. It involved consolidating various parcels of land, loosely known as
the "Greater St Lucia Wetland Park", into a single integrated park which could provide "a
framework for mobilising significant private sector investment that will facilitate major job
creation" and drive "large-scale tourism development." (Lubombo SDI, 1997a: 13 :- 22).
Agricultural projects identified in this early stage included a small cane growers project on the
lower Usuthu, a sugar project at Ngwavuma, an irrigated agricultural node on the high value
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soils of Makhatini, another irrigated project in Railway Valley, and an agricultural node on the
Maputo River. (Lubombo SDI, 1998a: 25 -30).
With the Lubombo Protocol in place and a number of lead projects identified, the SDI was
ready to present itself to the public as a "strategic programme" of interventions designed to
release "the stifled potential" of the Lubombo region.. However, unlike many of its
counterparts, the launch of the Lubombo SDI was not so much an investors' conference as a
high profile public endorsement of an initiative that took a longer view of the development
process. This contrasted with the "official view" described in Chapter 2 (cf. Jourdan, 1998).
Fast-tracked SDls were supposed to culminate in such conferences. By contrast, the launch of
the Lubombo SDI was just that: the start of a process rather than its conclusion.
In May 1998, the heads of state of the three participating countries officially launched the
Lubombo SDI. Presidents Mandela and Chissano and King Mswati III outlined the vision of
the initiative and pledged the support of their respective governments. President Chissano
referred to the area's "abundance of natural wealth" and stated that the aim of the Lubombo
SDI was: "to end the paradox of poverty amidst plenty, deprivation despite potential
prosperity and severe backlogs in basic social services despite the inherent potential of the
area." President Mandela spoke of a cooperative approach to put "in place a secure and
viable investment framework, one that will allow us to put an end to this cruel legacy of
poverty amidst such a wealth of resources." He sketched the main interventions designed to
remove the constraints to private sector-driven growth in the region:
Government recognises that the upgrading andconstruction rif transport routes are vitalto a
viable scenario for investment. This is therefore a core component rif the development
initiative strategy. . .
[lf7e are takin!!J steps to create stable and co-operative governance in the region as well as
standard transnationalprotocols.. .
[Om} technical teams are looking at issues such as health and the control rif malaria, a
critical issue for the development cf tourism. Border posts will be streamlined and visa
requirements minimised And we are working through the land laws rif the three countries
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to ensure that land disputes are resolvedin a wqy that facilitates secure forms of tenurefor
local communities and investors alike.
(Lubombo SDI, 1998b).
4. Shifting the fundamentals
President Mandela set the agenda for the first phase of the SDI's implementation in his
speech at the SDr launch. The focus during this stage would be on laying the basis for
development by systematically addressing the major blockages identified during the
preparatory phase of the SDI. This required a programme of interventions designed to shift
what the SDr team called "the development fundamentals" .
Before implementation started, however, the Ministerial Committee took a decision to
suspend the Lubombo SDI's agricultural component. This followed the completion of
feasibility studies and meetings with various local stakeholders that indicated higher levels of
complexity than initially thought. The Ministerial Committee took the view that the limited
resources of the Lubombo SDr would be better deployed in the tourism sector where
conditions for large-scale delivery were more favourable. Thus, the Lubombo SDr narrowed
its approach from its initial agri-tourism brief to an exclusive focus on the tourism sector.
Henceforth, the initiative would prioritise a set of specific interventions designed to stimulate
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The SDI vision includes the emergence of the Lubombo region, particularly the Greater St
Lucia Wetland Park, as a major branded destination on a par with other southern African
icons such as the Kruger National Park, Cape Town and the Okavango Delta. The strategic
analysis conducted during the SDI's planning phase indicated that infrastructure deficits -
particularly roads - were a critical constraint to the realisation of this vision:
The irfrastruaura! deficit in much of the SDI refion mqy ... be considered a mqjorfactor
contributing to the underdevelopment - in certain cases, the near sterilisation - of the
tourism potential in la'l,e areas of high intrinsic qualiry in the north and east of the SDI
regzon.
(Lubombo SDI, 1998a: 5).
For the Lubombo's tourism potential to be released, the region needed to be fully integrated




First, the upgrading of the national road (N2) linking the region north to Gauteng and
Mpumalanga (via eastern Swaziland) and south to Richards Bay and Durban. Improving
the existing N2 corridor would enhance the region's linkages to the major source markets
of Durban and Gauteng, and improve the existing tourism circuit linking KwaZulu-Natal
(including the Lubombo region) to the well-established - and complementary - tourism
economy clustered around the southern Kruger National Park (via eastern Swaziland).
Second, the construction of a new road linking the N2 at Hluhluwe to Ponta do Ouro
and, eventually, Maputo in the north. The Lubombo Spine Road, as it became known,
was designed to bring paved access to the hitherto inaccessible north-east of Maputaland.
Tins area - particularly Kosi Bay and the coastline north of Sodwana - was widely
considered to have high tourism potential hitherto stifled, at least in part, by the absence
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of reliable road access. In the short term, the spine road would thus stimulate tourism in
the far north-east of KwaZulu-Natal; and, once the link to Maputo was complete, it
would create conditions for a new flow of tourists between the Lubombo region, Maputo
itself and, from there, to Mpumalanga and Gauteng via the so-called Maputo Corridor
(along the upgraded N4):
A direct road link between Northern KwaZulu-Natal and Mozambique willprovide the
foundation for building regional integration andstrengthening the regional economy such as




From the outset, the SDI argued that the design and delivery of infrastructure such as roads
should take into account not only the economic logic sketched above but also the social needs
of the region's residents. This involved aligning the hard deliverables with the broader social
objectives of government. Thus, the EIA commissioned at the start of the project included
detailed assessments of the social impacts of the proposed infrastructure. Following the
recommendations of the EIA, the Lubombo Spine Road was carefully aligned to optimise
rural resident's access to social infrastructure such as clinics and schools. Moreover, 11
secondary roads were commissioned to give approximately 75 000 people, who had been cut
off from development opportunities and health services in the past, all-weather links to the
new spine road. It, for example, provided access to 47 schools and placed 50% of the
population in the high-risk malaria area within 3km access of a tar road. (Lubombo SDI,
1999d: 10).
The tenders for the road included stringent local participation requirements including targets
for the use of local small contractors. The road was tendered in four phases to enable
residents from four sub-areas along the route to benefit from the construction. The phased
approach also enabled a progressive increase in the local benefit targets incorporated in the
tender requirements. f "In the event, more than 50% of the work was taken up by small
businesses led by local entrepreneurs and the Lubombo Spine Road became an early example
of a preferential procurement approach that has since become standard practice in many
government infrastructure contracts .
Road building thus became one of the centre pieces of SDI delivery after its launch in 1998.
In the medium term, upgraded infrastructure offered the promise of increased tourism flows,
greater economic efficiency in general and better access to services for the residents of the
Lubombo region. However, in the short term, road construction also offered an opportunity
to demonstrate "hard" delivery on the ground and to consolidate political support for the
SDI at the national, provincial and local levels. The proposed route of the Lubombo Spine
22 The phasing of the road was also used strategically to secure funds its completion. Phases 1 and 4
(the start and end of the road) were commissioned first, thus creating pressure to complete the
middle sections!
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Road was reviewed by the same team of ministers that had attended the signing of the
Lubombo framework three years earlier. A national cabinet decision authorising the
construction was obtained via a submission from the Department of Transport. A steering
committee under the guidance of the Lubomb o SDI was formed involving not only national
and provincial players but also representatives from local government and the local
communities (via the so-called "road forums"). A high-profile sod-turning ceremony was
organised at which both former President Mandela and Minister Buthelezi spoke. The
symbolism of the two major ANC and IFP figures together raising their hands in support of
the Lubombo road was a powerful endorsement which built momentum and made it difficult
for lesser figures in either party to obstruct the progress of the initiative. A local project
committee, comprising representatives of local government, the tribal authority, the road
forum and the Lubombo SDI, was formed to oversee the construction of each phase of the
road. And throughout the process, the Lubombo SDI engaged with an NGO forum
consisting of various organisations with an interest in the development of Maputaland,
particularly those that had been involved in the mining debate and whose primary interest was
in the protection of the area's conservation assets.
Overall, the road projects enabled a positive engagement between various actors at the
national, provincial and local levels. This lay the groundwork for a more cooperative
approach to the development of a long-neglected region. Thus, the road become an example
of positive, area-based project management that drew together actors that had in the past
often engaged in damaging infighting onto a common platform. This "joining up" operated
not only horizontally (pulling together local government, tribal authorities, other community
organisations and NGOs) but also vertically (along the local/provincial/national axis). This
was particularly important in the context of the deep social and economic tensions that - as
discussed earlier - afflict the region.
However, it is important to stress that the participatory process was carefully managed to
ensure progress in an environment where political infighting had in the past paralysed
delivery. The strategic intervention - the principle of the new road - and the tirneline for its
deliverywere not opened to consultation (the high level intervention was directed by a cabinet
decision and endorsed by political figures from both the ANC and IFP at the national and
65
provincial levels). Instead, the participatory process was focused on issues of local
importance - the alignment of the road, the participation of local contractors, etc. Also,
different actors with different interests were not consulted in a single open forum. So, for
example, the environmental NGOs, who had taken 'ownership' of St Lucia during the mining
debate and who remained largely focused on an environmental agenda, were engaged through
a series of separate meetings where the environmental issues surrounding the road were
extensively discussed. Local communities, on the other hand, whose primary interests lay in
shaping the implementation of the project to their social and ·economic benefit, were
consulted through the road forums and other local meetings. Bottom-up engagement was
thus prioritised allowing the different interest groups an opportunity to shape delivery at the
project level. But this engagement was not at the level of principle - the high level strategic
intervention was endorsed at the appropriate level and was not opened to discussion in the
local arena. Moreover, a flexible approach was developed that engaged different interest
groups differently based on their unique characteristics and interests without allowing the
strategic thrust of the programme to become bogged down by the conflicting agendas of the
local actors. Gareth Coleman, former CEO of the KZN Tourism Authority describes this
approach in the following terms:
The SDI .. . carried out ... consultation on their terms anddid not allow themselves toget
drawn into the myriad 0/ issues that would have held back delivery. Whilst thry didthis,
thry also relied very heavilY on political support to drive through their programme . . .
(Coleman, 2004).
The approach sketched above also involved "the 'bending' of line department funds and
activities to the local environment" (Adebayo and Todes, 2003: 30). In this case, R654-
million from the national treasury was applied to simultaneously deliver the conditions for
tourism-led growth (a national priority) and improved livelihoods for the impoverished
residents of the region (a provincial/local priority). For an initiative whose primary aim was
to shift the development trajectory of a stagnant region, it was crucial that infrastructure
delivery demonstrated a new, cooperative approach to development. In a region with a long
history of tensions between and within conservationists, local communities, tribal groups,
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political parties and levels of government, high profile co-operation around a major project
did indeed have a powerful demonstration effect.
The road thus provides an example of how delivery of a key SDI intervention was aligned
with a broader set of priorities. By ensuring that the road served not only the economic
development goals of government but also its social priorities, support for the SDI was
consolidated outside the core departments (frade and Industry, and Transport) and resources
mobilised from other line budgets. So, for example, the Departments of Public Works as well
as Arts, Culture, Science and Technology contributed to the project because it was perceived
to be aligned with their priorities.
4.2 Malaria control
Research conducted for the Lubombo SDI showed that high rates of malaria infection in the
Lubombo area were one of the major causes of ongoing underdevelopment and poverty.
There is no doubt thatmalaria has hadserious detrimental economic effects on development
in the [LtbomboJ area and will continue to so if it is not managed in a co-ordinated
manner, for which we have the tools. The latter is highlighted by the extremefy low malaria
risk «2 casesper fOOO head ofpopulation perannum) in ma'!YfoT7JJerfy high risk areas
inKwaZulu-Natal andMpumalanga Province.
(Re§onal Malaria Control Commission, 1999).
The research showed that malaria was closely linked to the high incidence of other killer
diseases, especially diarrhoea and chest infections. Combined with HIV-AIDS, the disease
had devastating health impacts on the residents of the Lubombo region. Moreover, the high
prevalence of malaria was a deterrent to tourists, thus further undermining the potential
growth of the SDI's target industry. South Africa's environment and tourism minister, Valli
Moosa, said in his opening speech at the signing ceremony of the malaria control protocol:
Cumntfy, South Africa is e,!jqying the biggest and most prolonged tourism boom in its
history. The year 1998 marked the twelfth successiveyear ofincreased visitor arrivals. . .
But we all know that malaria can have very serious negative impacts on tourism and the
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Anopheles can, quite easilY, chase awqy theforeign and domestic tourists upon whom we
are pinning ourhopesfor!fVwth andjobsin this country and also in the reion as a whole.
(Utbombo SDI, 1999a).
Th e matter had become particularly acute during the second half of the nineties when malaria
infection rates in the region escalated dramatically. In the far northern KwaZulu-Natal
section of the Lubombo SDI, the annual number of notified cases more than doubled after
1995 and reached an all-time high in the first half of 1999 when more than 30,000 cases were
reported, some as far south as Richards Bay (Department of Health, 1999). Without more
effective control measures, the diseases had the potential to spiral out of control and to
frustrate economic development in the region despite the gains in infrastructure.
To combat this threat, the Lubombo SDI decided to reinforce an existing initiative. It
launched an expanded cross-border malaria control programme. Working in close
collaboration with the relevant health authorities, the SDI submitted a briefing document to a
trilateral ministerial meeting in 1998, outlining the negative effects of malaria on development
and proposing a new malaria control programme for the Lubombo region. The proposal was
accepted and a process launched that culminated in the signing of an agreement by the three
Lubombo SDI member countries in Johannesburg on 14 October 1999.
The General Lubombo SDI Protocol envisaged the creation of specific regulatory
frameworks to advance the socio-economic objectives of the initiative. The Malaria Control
Protocol was one such agreement that took the general corrunitments of the earlier protocol
to a level of specific intervention. It was designed to build on the undertakings of the general
protocol by corrunitting the three countries to a programme of action in the health sector".
The malaria protocol thus enjoined the Lubombo SDI partners to co-operate closely towards
23 In paragraph three, the Malaria Control Protocol states:
Pursuant to the undertakings in the General LSDI Protocol, the Governments are signing a Malaria
Control Protocol. . .
(I.Jtbombo SDI, 1999b).
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the goal of significantly reducing the incidence of malaria morbidity and mortality in the
region. Importantly, the protocol put in place an institutional mechanism, the Lubombo
Regional Malaria Control Commission (LRMCC), encompassing a group of scientists, public
health professionals and malarial control managers, to co-ordinate the programme. It also set
clear delivery targets for the programme:
The RMCC aims, withinfiveyears after initiation 0/the programme, to reduce the incidence
0/Plasmodium falciparum in Maputo province - perhaps the hardest hit area 0/ the
Lubombo SDI - from 400 per tODD to less than 20 per 1000. It plans to reduce the
incidence of such infictions in the South African and Swailland parts 0/ the region from
250per 1000 to5 per 1000within fiveyears.
(Lubombo SDL 1999a).
The RMCC operated with an initial R40-million budget, which included significant grants
from the South African Business Trust and Mozal, the company responsible for the
development of one of the world's largest aluminium smelters in southern Mozambique. It






An extension of the existing malaria control programme to southern Mozambique. The
programme, which had demonstrated its efficacy in northern KwaZulu-Natal, involved
regular spraying of homes with an effective insecticide.
Increased primary health care service to proactively identify and treat malaria cases, and
thus reduce the reservoir of parasites.
Inclusion of malariologists as part of planning teams in water resource developments.
A transnational programme to monitor and evaluate interventions, including active use of
geographic information systems.
A training programme to share regional expertise and give members of rural villages skill
in malaria controL
(Lubombo SDI 1999a and b).
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The work of the programme began immediately, and by 2004 had achieved remarkable
success. The reduction targets set in the protocol were exceeded with infection rates on the
South African side of the border dropping by more than 90% and the whole of Lake St Lucia
being declared a malaria-free area.
As in the case of the Lubombo road, the malaria control programme offered an opportunity
to demonstrate delivery, build political support and forge new co-operative relationships
between formerly disconnected or hostile actors, including cross-border linkages. It again
combined the removal of a major obstacle to economic growth with the delivery of much-
needed and immediate social benefits. It also strengthened transnational linkages thus
providing a platform for co-operation between the three partner countries in the Lubombo
SDI. This was important at the time because the Mozambican and Swazi components of the
Lubombo initiative had lagged well behind the South African initiative. Also, the programme
was able to galvanise support from organised business in the form of grants from some of the
region's biggest firms. This brought the private sector into the initiative, thus raising the
profile of the Lubombo region, building confidence and generally laying the groundwork for
longer-term public-private partne rships in the region. Again, the programme offered an
opportunity to draw together disparate groups - including national, provincial and local
political leaders; the private sector; and other local actors - onto a common platform under
the banner of the Lubombo SDI.
4.3 The Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area
Another subsidiary agreement envisaged in the General Lubombo SDI Protocol related to the
establishment of trans frontier conservation areas (fFCAs) spanning the borders of the three
partner countries. The implementation process was initiated shortly after the launch of the
Lubombo SDI with a series of technical meetings between the three countries including
representatives from the various conservation agencies, provincial and national departments,
as well as donors and multi-lateral development agencies such as the World Bank. As in the
case of malaria control, a concept document was prepared and submitted to the Trilateral
Ministerial Committee for approval. This was followed by the preparation of a Lubombo
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Transfrontier Conservation Protocol that was signed by the three countries in 2000. The
Protocol set the following broad objectives:
• To promote regional integration with a focus on tourism and conservation in accordance
with the goals of the New Partnership for African Development;
• To consolidate protected areas across the region; and
• To create a regional ecotourism node that is linked to adjacent tourism nodes in southern
Africa.
In May 2002, the ministers established a trilateral commission to implement the protocol.
The commission has formed task teams, comprising representatives from the three countries,
that are currendy working on four trans frontier nodes:
• Ndumu-Tembe-Futi (South Africa/Mozambique);
• Ponto do Ouro-Kosi Bay (South Africa/Mozambique);
• Nsuabane-Pongola (South Africa/Swaziland); and
• Lubombo Conservancy-Goba (Swaziland/Mozambique).
Although progress on the Lubombo TFCAs has been slower than in other areas of delivery,
the programme has nonetheless provided a platform for the three countries to work together
in pursuit of a larger regional vision that is important in the long run if the gains made by the
SDI in South Africa are to be carried across the borders in future. It encourages the trilateral
partners - Mozambique and Swaziland - to participate in the regional vision and ensures
proper planning on both sides of the border, which is a vital part of building long term
confidence in the Lubombo region".
24 It is also important to note that the co-operation with especially Mozambique was encouraged by
what might be called informal networks between some of the major figures in the SDI programme
in South Africa and their counterparts in Mozambique. People like Mac Maharaj and PaulJourdan
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The adoption of the TFCA project by the Lubombo SDI also allowed the strong
conservationist agenda that dominated it before the SDI's intervention to be redirected. By
supporting and fast-tracking the TFCA, the SDI could advance an economic agenda based on
the latter's mandate.
The TFCA also become a mechanism to house areas that the Lubombo SDI had not
completed including the upgrading of border and the extension of the Lubombo road from
the Ponta do Ouro to Maputo.
Finally, the Lubombo TFCA was an international programme and therefore clearly fell under
national jurisdiction in South Africa. This allowed the SDI - which became the major
sponsor of the TFCA - to avoid being incorporated into provincial structures where it would
become bureaucratised and lose the flexibility of its 'special agency' approach.
5. Conclusion
The Lubombo SDI built on the momentum created by the mining controversy, the Review
Panel Report as well as the decision by Cabinet to prioritise conservation and tourism as the
drivers for economic regeneration in an area mired in a deepening recession. As the SDI
programme emerged from within the Departments of Transport, and Trade and Industry, the
Lubombo region was targeted and cast as a classic agri-tourism initiative. Its underpinning





An area with inherent, but underdeveloped potential, was targeted.
An array of factors stifling development were identified.
An institutional framework, including a trilateral protocol, a ministerial committee, a task
team and a project manager were appointed and resourced.
A concerted effort to remove the constraints, particularly in South Africa, was mounted.
had spent much of their exile in Mozambique and were strongly integrated into the political
networks there.
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However, from an early stage, the Lubombo SDI took a longer view of the development
process. It recognised the importance of building a track record that demonstrated
government was serious and could deliver on the ground while at the same time shifting the
fundamentals. Its earliest documents already stress the need to systematically address the root
causes of underdevelopment including the institutional tensions that bedevilled the region.
Shifting the development fundamentals in an area such as that targeted by the Lubombo SDI
would require a much longer process than the "fast track" envisaged by mainstream SDI
planners.
The Lubombo SDI also understood the need to build political support for the project not just
at the highest level but also at the provincial and local levels. Programmes such as the building
of roads or the control of malaria thus provided opportunities to pull together a range of
actors into co-operative ventures that showed the complementarity of national and local
objectives. These programmes demonstrated that national, provincial and local interests were
not necessarily in conflict: it was possible to simultaneously deliver immediate benefits to rural
residents and improve conditions for longer term economic efficiency. But they also required
careful management to ensure that the conflicting agendas of the various actors did not
paralyse delivery. A flexible approach was needed that engaged different stakeholders
differendy based on their interests but without jeopardising the strategic thrust of the
programme.
It may thus be argued that the Lubombo SDI exhibited an "institutionalist logic" in the sense
discussed in Chapter 2. Like other SDIs it was a regional development intervention designed
to mobilize the inherent economic potential of Maputaland through an upgrading of the
region's broadly defined supply-base. This involved the delivery of hard infrastructure as well
as sponsoring health measures and establishing appropriate regulatory frameworks including
transnational protocols on malaria control and transfrontier conservation. But the deliveryof
these measures were also used to address "the invisible factors in economic development"
(Morgan, 1997: 496) - the broadly defined institutional features of the region - that impeded
economic renewal. Thus, these measures were used to harmonize national, provincial and
local agendas and to bring a range of social actors into new cooperative alignments. They
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THE GREATER ST LUCIA WETLAND PARK
1. Introduction
One of the fundamental tenets of the SDI approach is the identification, appraisal and
promotion of "potential investment opportunities, particularly one or more propulsive
"anchor" projects designed to serve as magnets to additional downstream or related
investments, thereby expanding the size and scope of [a given] sector within the SDI area"
(Iourdan, 1997: 2). As noted in Chapter 3, the Lubombo SDI early on identified several lead
projects with the potential to deliver tourism development at various locations in the
Lubombo area. However, only one of the projects fitted the required profile of an anchor
project in the sense advocated by Jourdan. The Greater St Lucia Wedand Park (GSLWP)
offered the scale and "propulsive" qualities that could deliver significant economic growth in
the Lubombo area.25
The current chapter provides an overview of the GSLWP anchor project from its initial
conceptualisation to its eventual implementation. The focus is mainly on the period between
1997, when the Lubombo SDI first defined the concept, and approximately 2002 when the
GSLWP Authority became fully operational. The main concern in this chapter is to describe
how the Lubombo SDI sought to put in place the fundamentals required to implement its
anchor project, particularly an institutional structure with the capacity to drive the economic
renewal of the GSL\W. This involved managing a complex set of tensions with the
incumbent conservation agency. In delivering on its agenda, the SDI concentrated not only
on the building of political support but also the passing of new legislation to enable the
consolidation of the GSLWP and the creation of an independent management institution
25 The other lead projects, identified by the Lubombo SDI and described in Chapter 3, lacked the
required scale and faced higher barriers than St Lucia.
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with the organisational structure, resources and commercial expertise to undertake the
challengingand complex task of optimising the tourism potential of the GSLWP.
The achievements of the Authority since its establishment and the many challenges it
currently faces are largely beyond the scope of the current study, and are therefore only briefly
sketched in the concluding sections of the chapter. Nevertheless, the chapter does raise some
of the key risks faced by the Authority in carrying forward its mandate. The major challenge
for the Authority will be to retain its ability to deliver in an increasingly complex institutional
environment, particularly at the local level where it is engaging with fledgling local
government structures that are involved in negotiating their respective spheres of
competence, as well as their relationship with the Authority.
2. Developing the concept
2.1 The NPB/CCA proposal
A study assessing the feasibility of establishing a company to develop the ecotourism potential
of the GSLWP was co-sponsored in 1996 by the Natal Parks Board (NPB), as it was then
known, and Conservation Corporation Africa (CCA), a private company that owned a
property known as the Phinda Resource Reserve on the south-eastern fringe of uMkhuze.
The study - known as the NPBjCCA proposal- recommended the creation of a company
that would acquire use rights to the greater St Lucia area (from the Natal Parks Board) and
the Phinda Resource Reserve (from Conservation Corporation Africa). Against these assets,
the company would raise capital and undertake infrastructure development (including
ecotourism facilities). The management of these facilities would be offered to the private
sector and the NPB at commercial rents, while the latter would be contracted as the natural
resource manager for the entire park. (Leo-Smith, 1997).
As part of its early appraisal of the tourism potential of the region, the Lubombo SDr
assessed the NPBjCCA proposal. The SDr argued in favour of the idea that a consolidated




























Mapoftheconsolidated GSLWPproclaimed in 2000 in relation to roads andplaces
(Lubombo SDI, 2000b)
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The Greater St Lucia Wetland area has certain key advantages thatpositions it as an
anchor opportuniry for the KwaZulu-Natal SDI region. It represents a large-scale
development opportuniry thatcan be rapidlY implemented, create a significant number ofnew
job opportunities, link in with other sectors of the local economy and promote economic
growth in a wqy that does not destroy the natural andcultural assets ofthe region. The scale
ofthe development combined with the region's exceptional natural attributes . .. suggest that
it has the potential to establish a strong market image and attract the significant market
share it requires tobe successfuL
(Lubombo SDIa, 1997: 33).
The SDI thus endorsed the concept of private sector-driven development in a GSLWP
consolidated under the management of a single authority, but it also noted some key concerns
with the Leo-Smith proposal:
•
•
It was unclear how the proposed company would deal with the complex land issues that
affected the proposed park. For example, state-owned land earmarked for incorporation
into the park comprised 11 separate parcels, all designated for conservation purposes
under different legislative provisions; large sections of the proposed park were subject to
conflicting land claims from former beneficial owners evicted during the apartheid era;
and key areas were ecologically compromised by commercial afforestation and other
detrimental land uses.
It was also unclear whether, or how, other parties, including land claimants and holders of
communal land rights on the fringes of the park, could acquire an interest in the proposed
company. This created the risk of "a new form of spatial segregation between a core
development monopolized by large institutional interests and low benefit peripheral
developments on communal land whose competitiveness is severely compromised
because they do not have adequate access to the prime resource" (Lubombo SDI, 1997a:
35).
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• Finally, the SDI questioned the preferential position of a private partner in a development
company that would hold monopolistic rights over a substantial public resource that was
widely considered a national asset.
2.2 The concept defined
After this initial assessment, the SDI debated its own proposal for the development and
management of the GSLWP. Initially two models were considered. Both accepted the
importance of the private sector in providing the capital and expertise to unlock the economic
value of the GSLWP. But differences emerged regarding the role of the state . Some key
figures in the national SDI programme proposed an aggressive priva tisation approach that
would see the "concessioning out" of the entire Park with the state retaining only a minimal
regulatory role. The Lubombo SDI management and others argued in favour of a stronger
role for the state as an active mediator and regulator. This was considered of particular
importance in a region that faced a unique set of ecological, economic and social challenges.
This was essentially a continuation of Lubombo SDI's view that the specific conditions in
Maputaland - including the highly complex institutional arrangements described in the
previous chapter - required a strong institutional solution.
In the event, the Lubombo SDI opted for the second approach. Based on a commitment to
a robust developmental role for the state and the recognition that the parti cular circumstances
of GSLWP, like the broader Lubombo region required active mediation, the SDI drafted a
proposal for the GSLWP that was "designed to deliver a co-ordinated planning and
regulatory framework for rapid, large-scale and efficient private sector driven development in
the greater St Lucia area" (Lubombo SDI, 1997b: 5).
The Lubombo SDI's thinking, as articulated in the initial proposal for the establishment of
the GSLWP, was underpinned by the key principles that would set the agenda for the
development of the Park in the following years:
• The GSL WP is considered a national asset that requires an ifJicient, state-controlled






Thekeyfactor detennining the economicpotential ojthe Park is its status asa relative!;
pristine nature conservation area, mcognised both nationaliy and internationally as an
underdeveloped natural asset which is unique in Africa. It is thereJom essential to
maintain and enhance the environmental integriry ojthe area. This means that the
Park must be managed according to sound conservation practices fry a competent land
manager such astheNatal ParksBoard orits successor.
The sumJUnding local communities must benefit dimet!; and material!; from the
proposed developments in the short, medium and long term. [fhis includes] ...
succesifulland claimants [who] must be accommodated in whatever is plannedfor the
Park.
In order to maximise economic benefitsfor ... communities... it is 1lecessary to ensure
that su.fficient capital and expertise is attracted to the area to unlock itsfull economic
potential This means the involvement ojthe private sector as theprimary force in the
commercialisation ojthe Park. It also means that development opportunities cannot be
monopolised fry the conservation agenry and should be awarded ona most efficient basis
through an open andcompetitive tenderprocess.
The South Africanpublic must be guaranteed continued ajJOrdable access to the park
andits reaeational opportunities.
(Lubombo SDI, 1997b: 4-5).
Based on this thinking, the SDI developed a precise set of recommendations to deliver its
vision of developing a world-class park that could transform the economic landscape of the
Lubombo region.
2.3 Institutional arrangements
The SDI recommended that a dedicated statutory Authority be created to drive the
management, administration and economic development of the GSLWP:
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• This would be in line with international best practice where national environmental
assets are placedunderthe control ofsuch authorities.26
• TheA uthori(y will be charged with the optimal development ofthe economicpotential of
the park in theform of tourism, hunting, utilisation of natural resources and other
opportunities.
• It willproduce and retain long-term responsibilityfor the eJftctive implementation ofan
Integrated Development andManagementPlan for the Park in collaboration with the
provincial conseroation sennce. The IDMP willprovide a regulatory framework and
guide allfuture development in the Park including the scale, range and distribution of
tourismfacilities.
• The A uthori(y willappoint theNatal Parks Board or its successor as environmental
managerwithin theframework ofthe IDMP. . .
(Lubombo SDI, 1997b: 6).
The new authority would be governed by a two-tier structure: a representative and suitably
skilled advisory board tasked with policy development and oversight; and a small,
professional, executive arm responsible for the day-to-day management of the park. The
board would be appointed by, and accountable to, the national Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism, and comprise key stakeholders from the national, provincial and local
levels.
26 During early-1997, a technical team from the Lubombo SOl visited Australia to study Australian
protected area management models, particularly as they related to large protected areas including
World Heritage Sites. It was here - especially in the management arrangements for the Great
Barrier Reef and the Wet Tropics in northern Queensland - that the SDI was first exposed to the
idea of dedicated management authorities set up under national legislation to look after large
conservation assets of global importance.
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2.4 Financial arrangements
The SDI proposal argued that the Authority would require substantial capital grants to
develop the park as well as ongoing budgetary support to cover its recurrent expenditure.
However, it would seek to recover costs aggressively through the concessioning of
commercial opportunities on a competitive and most efficient basis. In a first phase, the
Authority would prepare and concession a number of ''lead'' projects designed to
demonstrate deliveryand build confidence in the commercial potential of the park.
2.5 Local benefit
The SDI argued that the development of the GSLWP should be actively aligned with the
government's broader priorities including its commitments to social and empowerment goals.
It was vital that the Park should integrate productively into the broader economy. This was
not only considered a developmental but also conservation imperative. Only if the Park
become a regional economic asset generating benefit for the region's residents would its long-
term conservation be assured. One instrument to achieve this was a vigorous local benefit
programme managed by the proposed Authority and designed to optimise the integration
between tourism-driven development of the GSL\W and the local economy:
The Authoriry willidentify potential local equiry partners for specific pro/eels. It willalso
activelY promote other benefits to local communities, andwillprovide and/or secure support
to assistpotential beneficiaries in aniving at afinancial, legal andinstitutional ordering that
would enable them to maximise the flow of benefits thry receive from development of the
park.
The Authoriry willalso initiate a small business support and development programme 111
the region acfjacent to the park. . .
(Lubombo SDI, 1997b: 9).
The Authority was thus designed to mediate one of the basic social conflicts afflicting
development in the region, the tension between local residents who suffered exclusion at the
hands of state-driven conservation discussed in Chapter 3. This would also align the work of
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the Authority with the broader social goals of the post-apartheid government thus helping to
ensure continued political support.
2.6 Land
One of the important challenges facing the SDI in the establishment of the GSLWP related
to land. As noted above, the land designated for inclusion in the Park included several
discrete parcels and was subject to conflicting restitution claims:
It is desirable that all the landowned I!J the State andfalling within the Park should be
consolidated andmade suo/ect to a single designation providing the highestprotection andthe
basefor itsproclamation asa World Heritage Site.
. . .It seems that the preferred course would be to leave the land vested in the State, and to
proclaim the Park under a law al/owingfor the designation thereofsuo/ect to thejurisdiction
of the Park Authon!} and allowing the management struato» to deal with the land as
though it were the owner, save asfar asalienation is concerned.
(Lubombo SDI, 1997b: 9).
2.7 Key advantages
In the view of the SD I, as expressed in the 1997-proposal, a statutory authority would bring




ensure political accountability and continued state regulation of an important public
resource, thus guaranteeing the integrity of the Park as both a protected area and an
econonuc asset.
facilitate optimal commercial development by ensuring equitable access to opportunities
for all potential developers including the private sector.
prepare and manage an economic and social development plan, closely linked to regional
and national development objectives, and designed to integrate spatial and stakeholder
interests;
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• provide a framework for all stakeholders, including the private sector, local government,
communities and successful restitution claimants, to participate in the development and
management of the Park; and
• provide and efficient mechanism to achieve restitution of land rights without
compromising the conservation integrity or commercial potential of the Park.
3. Establishing a Management Authority for the GSLWP
3.1 Anticipating opposition and building political support
Having clarified the principal elements of its St Lucia proposal, the Lubombo SDI proceeded
with its implementation. In the first instance, this required building political support for the
proposal at the national and provincial levels. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the SDI
operated within the "space" that opened politically and institutionally after 1994. It also
carefully nurtured a political support base that spanned South Africa's major political divides.
The political space available to the SDI at the time proved crucial in carrying forward the St
Lucia proposal.
Overall, the importance of assembling strong political support and maintaining the visible
ownership by key figures from the national and provincial spheres were considered vital to
the success of the SDI and its anchor project. In an area riven with conflict (see Chapter 3),
where many development projects had stalled due to political tensions, a vigorous campaign
of the sort described above was needed to build the momentum required to shift the
Lubombo region's development fundamentals. Given the ambitious progran1ffie of the
Lubombo SDI, which was about reconfiguring the institutional and economic landscape of
Maputaland, a backlash was expected from various disaffected parties who assumed certain
rights in the areas, and others who felt they had not benefited from or did not control the
process.
In particular, the SDI anticipated opposition from within the ranks of the KwaZulu Natal
Nature Conservation Service (NCS). The NCS, which at the time had just emerged from the
merger between the old Natal Parks Board and the KwaZulu Department for Nature
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Conservation, was the incumbent conservation authority at St Lucia, and the SDI's proposal
would effectively replace it with a streamlined, pro-business authority. The SDI's thinking was
informed by the following analysis:
Conservation authorities tend to be staffed I!J persons selectedfor their scientific and wildlife
management skills, notfor their business acumen. . .. Moves to involve the private sector in
a'!Y conservation area activities may be strongly resisted I!J those charged with the
conservation responsibili(y. ... Given this attitude, tension seems inevitable between those
who seek to expand the economic contribution of conserved areas and those who seek to
maintain the status quo.
(Universi(y ofCape Town, 1990: 3).
The SDI's own thinking was indeed about "involving the private sector" and "expanding the
economic contribution" of the GSLWP. And the monopolistic approach of the current
conservation authority was indeed seen as a major impediment to the SDI's plans:
Like ma'!Y other state-owned reserves, the GSLWP was managed and developed I!J a
public agenry that combined a protectionist ethic with a monopolistic approach to
development. Thus, the commercial development of what is prime tourism estate was
dominated I!J a state agenry whose primary task was conservation management andwho was
institutionallY, ideologicallY andfinanciallY ill equipped to optimise the potential ofthe area.
The mult has been sub optimal development mainlY gean:d towards the perceived
recreational needs of the domestic middle classes, andwhich, in most instances, imposed a net
loss 01/ the publicpurse.
(Lubombo SDI, 2000b:82).
This tension did indeed emerge as the Lubombo SDI took its proposal forward and became
one of the key institutional features of the GSLWP project. It is explored in greater detail
below. At this stage, it is important to stress that the SDI anticipated such opposition and
moved vigorously from the outset to build the high level political support which was required
to drive its proposal forward.
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From mid-1997, the SDI management and its political champions therefore embarked on a
vigorous campaign to communicate the principal aspects of its proposal to key decision
makers at all levels. From the outset, the SDI stressed that the proposal was rooted in the
recommendations of the Review Panel and Cabinet's 1996 no-mining decision. It also
stressed that the project was not just about delivering private investment but also jobs and a
range of other social benefits . By late-1997, the SDI concept for an anchor project centred
on the St Lucia wedands had been presented to various committees of the national and
provincial executives, and in principle cabinet approval obtained for the establishment of the
GSLWP Authority as a national body, accountable to the Minister of Environmental Affairs
and Tourism".
Once approval was in place, the SDI continued to keep key decision makers informed and
involved. Much lobbying of individuals as well as numerous presentations to the board of the
provincial conservation agency, the provincial executive, the national cabinet and other key
institutions followed. The SDI programme and its major elements were further reinforced by
including supportive references in speeches made by important political figures at SDI-
organised events (including President Thabo Mbeki, Deputy President Jacob Zuma, Minister
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Minister Pallo Jordan and, once he became Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Mohammed Valli Moosa).
In Chapter 2 it was noted that the South African constitution "has created possibilities for
aggressive territorial competition at various spatial scales... Given that certain key regional
development decisions have been moved into the inter-governmental arena, the constitution
forces national policy-makers to enter into relationships with local agents" (Hall, 1999: 8)28.
27 The SOl used the momentum created by its principal proposal to also obtain approval from the
national and provincial executives for a number of secondary objectives, including the removal
commercial forestry from the GSLWP, theremoval of the militarybaseon the Ndlozipeninsula and
the development of a national policy on the restitution of land claims in protectedareas.
28 See also:
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One such area in which there is potential for conflict is the environment. The Constitution
vests legislative competence with regard to the environment (and regional development) in
both the national and provincial spheres:
The confluence of these two spheres ofgovernmmt and the various enactments passed by
them, creates the potentialfor conflict which, if it does arise, willinvolve the Province andthe
National Government in disputes as to their respective competences in the area of
environmental control and management in KZN and/or as to which of the conflicting
measures willprevail: So, for example, the Provincial Act passed by KZN, charges the
KZN Nature Conservation Board with the primary responsibiliry to direct the management
of the development and promotion of ecotoutism facilities within certain protected areas
within the province, while the Environment Conservation A ct 73 of 1989 ( ECA) vests
the primary autbority to determine poliry with regard to the environment and to determine
norms and standards to be complied with and implemented throughout the country in the
National Minister of Emironmenta! Affairs and Tourism. The ECA obliges at!}
provincial authoriry which has an influence on the environment to exercise its p01vers and
peiform itsduties in accordance with poliryformulated at national leveL
(Lubombo SDI, 2000b:40).
This concurrence, and the conflicting legislation passed at national and provincial levels,
meant that the legal basis for the creation of the proposed authority for the GSLWP was in
doubt. This was of particular concern given the argument that the provincial conservation
agency should continue managing the GSLWP (see below for further discussion of this
point). In order to clarify the situation and establish national jurisdiction in the case of the
GSLWP, the SDI developed an alternative approach.
In July 1997, South Africa had deposited its ratification of the World Heritage Convention,
and the Department of Environmental Affairs had nominated the country's first properties,
The Constitution . .. sets the scene for a complex admixture of top down regional poliry and bottom-up
regionalism in other areas ofpoliry I!J specifying that certain key competencies are the concurrent responsibility
ofnational andprovincialgovernment (Hamson, 1998:5).
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including the GSLWP, to be inscribed on the World Heritage Lisr" . H owever, Section 231(4)
of the South African constitution determines that international agreements, such as the World
Heritage Site Convention, only become part of the coun try's domestic law when they are
expressly incorporated through national legislation. Ratification impose d certain international
law obligations on the South African state (in relation to other signatory states) to abide by its
commitments in terms of the convention but, because of the constitutional provision referred
to above, these obligations could not be enforced within South Africa until such time as they
were made part of domestic law through national legislation. This opened the door for the
passing of national legislation incorporating the Convention into South African law and
providing national government with the legal means to discharge its responsibilities under the
Convention thus effectively "taking control" ofWorld Heri tage Sites such as St Lucia."
The SDr thus developed an argument in favour of dedicated framework legislation to
incorporate the World Heritage Convention into South African law and to create the legal
basis for the proposed GSLWP Authority. A process was launched in partnership with the
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism which culminated in the passing of the
World Heritage Convention Act in 1999. This Act not only embeds the Convention in
Z9 A significant portion of the GSLWP - over 85% - was entered on the World Heritage List in
December 1999. The natural values in terms of which parts of the GSLWPwere inscribed on the
List include outstanding examples of ecological processes, superlative naturalphenomena and scenic
beauty, and exceptional biodiversity and threatened species. In addition to these values, the GSLWP
also contains four wetlands of international importance recognised under the RAMSAR
Convention.
30 The so-called Kumleben report into the Institutional Arrangements for Nature Conservation in
South Africa made a similar point:
Though a protected area is inevitab!J within one or other province, one is mistaken to regard it as
"belonging" to such province. A provincial protected area is essentially a national
asset, and in some cases an international asset, in which every South African
has an interest. This is confirmed I!J the faa that the RSA , not theprovinces, is parry to a
number of international Conventions and it is the State that has undertaken to assist in attaining
their objectives. (Kumleben etal, 1998:23.)
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domestic law but also brings a specifically South African perspective to the management of
World Heritage Sites. It combines a fundamental commitment to the protection,
conservation and presentation of World Heritage values with a strong emphasis on locally
beneficial economic development; by balancing conservation with job creating economic
development, the Act thus creates a legal instrument appropriate to South African
circumstances - including those in the areas surrounding the GSLWP - where high levels of
poverty demand an approach that optimises the economic potential of heritage assets without
compromising their natural and cultural integrity. It became the single piece of environmental
legislation in South Africa that puts development and conservation into a single, integrated
framework, and simultaneously provides the legal basis for the establishment of a
management authority (such as the GSLWP Authority) that can drive a balanced agenda (thus
correcting the protectionist, anti-development bias of incumbent agencies such as the NCS).
3.2 The Section 8 or 9 debate
Importantly, the World Heritage Convention Act gives the Minister of Environmental Affairs
and Tourism the power to intervene to ensure that institutions charged with the management
of World Heritage Sites have the capacity to discharge South Africa's obligations under the
Convention. Chapter II of the Act provides for two types of authority:
Section 9 empowers the national Minister ofEnvironmental Affairs and Tourism to create
!?y notice in the Government Gazette a new authori(y to look after a WorldHeritage Site.
Section 8, however, empowers the Minister to, where an existing organ of state is already
legalY in chatg/ ofa WorldHeritage Site, deem such an organ ofstate to be an A uthori(y
under theAct, and to strengthen oraddtoitspowers.
(Department ofEnvironmentalAffairs andTourism, 1999: 6).
The Minister thus has a choice either to appoint an existing institution as the manager of a
World Heritage Site or to create an entirely new authority for this purpose. In the case of the
GSLWP, this discretion created the conditions for a vigorous debate concerning the role of
the KZN Nature Conservation Service (or NCS as it was then known) .
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The anticipated opposition from the NCS materialised as the Lubombo SDI's proposal
gained momentum. Initially, it would seem, that the top management of the NCS did not
take the Lubombo SDI proposal seriously, believing it would not "take off." This is
confirmed by the following extract from the so-called Cole report into the restructuring of
KZN Wildlife (formerly known as the NCS):
Theperception . . . [is] that Top Management was "out of touch"... The example of the
Greater St Lucia Wetlands Park was held up as a case in point. It is said that the
inteffigence about the first moves toward the development of the SDI initiative was
discounted. "It wiffneverget of the ground" - and no attempt was made to be part of it
untilit was too late. The attitude seems to have been adtersarial.. . .
(KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife Board, 2001: 7).
Gareth Coleman, board member of the NCS at the time of these debates, describes the
attitude as follows:3!
Facing severe financial difficulties, management andgovernance problems, KZN Wildlife
was unable topqy a'!Y significant attention to what was happening with the GSLWP. . . .
in the initial stages, the senior management did not believe that an independent authon!)
would ever be established in the park. The approach of the Board, and elements within the
senior management team, proved to be very counter productive. Thry believed they would
receive the political support from the provincial government which would ensure their
3! Wayne Elliot, director of the former KwaZulu Department of Nature Conservation and former
Head of Department (Conservation) in KZN Wtlcllife further stresses this point:
There is no doubt that the ... senior leadership 0/ the NPB/NCS/ KZN Wildlife hada very
negative view 0/ the Lubombo SDI and the GSLWP. It is somewhat di.fficult to define this
negativity other than to assume that the GSLWP Authority was viewed as a threat to the
conservation authority at both a regional and national leveL This threat could onlY have been
around the tomism potential which [under the NPB/NCS/KZN Wildlife]. .. was being shown
to not be economicallY viable. . . (Eliott, 2004).
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continued management if the park. The Board tried tofight the establishment if an
independent authority to the bitter end .
(Coleman, 2004.)
Once the NCS realised the seriousness of the SDI proposal and the impact of the new World
Heritage legislation, it argued that it should be appointed as the authority to manage the
GSLWP in terms of Section 8 of the Act, on the grounds that it was the incumbent and that
the establishment of a new authority would duplicate an already existing institutional structure
with adverse implications for the Treasury. These arguments were developed in a long series
of submissions, correspondence, petitions and legal opinions . It is beyond the scope of the
current study to catalogue this process in detail but the following is an example of a
memorandum to the provincial cabinet submitted by the NCS in December 1998:
It is .. proposed that the Cabinet expresses its confidence in the legislation and institutions
which have been established in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, Iry resolving that the
KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Board be appointed ... to be the management
authoriryfor the Greater5t Lucia Wetland Park. Ifnecessary, apanelifexperts/national
advisors could be appointedtoprovide an oversight role in this respect.
(KwaZulu-NatalNature Conservation Board, 1998: 9).
The SDI, led by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, developed a
counter-proposal that argued in favour of a dedicated statutory authority for the GSLWP
established by the Minister in terms of Section 9 of the Act. Such an authority, it was argued,
would put in place a purpose-designed institution with the capacity to manage and optimally
develop the GSLWP in fulfilment of South Africa's obligations under the Act. It would
remedy the shortcomings of the NCS which, the SDI argued, was incapable of delivering
development in the complex conditions faced by St Lucia:
The question is not whether the NCS currentlY has the powers and dutiescontemplated in
the A ctbut whetherit has theinstitutional struaure, capaciry and implementationprocess to
achieve the oo/ectives sketched above. A lthough the NCS has an undoubted record of
accomplishmentin the conservationfield, several shortcomings suggest that it does nothave -
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and is unlikelY to develop - the capaci!} to establish the GSLWP as a major tourism
destination generating optimal benefits - includingjobs - to the region, theprovince andthe
nation. In a context where the long-term conservation of the GSLIVP is dependent on the
optimal developmentofits economicpotential, these shortcomings actuallY threaten thefuture
ofthe Park andits world heritage values.
(Lubombo SDI, 1999c).
The SDI argued that the NCS was incapable of optimising the tourism potential of the parks
under its control because of the way it was structured, managed and operated. The lack of
commercial orientation or a business ethic in the NCS was not something that was likely to
prove easy to change. It would almost certainly require a radical overhaul of the NCS's
existing structure and a reorientation of its mission and objectives; and it was arguable
whether such a reorientation - even if it could be achieved - was desirable or appropriate for
a conservation agency such as the NCS. As a result, tourism development in the GSLWP was
fragmented and had failed to generate the economic benefits that should have accrued to the
region. (Lubombo SDI, 1999c). Moreover, the NCS was in a dire financial position, which
fundamentally constrained its ability to drive the process required for the GSLWP's
regeneration:
Thiso'l!,anisation habituallY incurs huge operating losses - in theyear under review, R170m
ofoperating losses were incurred on turnover ofR137m - and its abili!} tofunction as a
going-concern is totallY dependent on continuing (and increasing) state support, which
amounted to R165m in theyear underconsideration. . . . in overall terms the o'l!,anisation
incurs a loss of R1,24 for every R1,OO ofoperating revenue it generates. . . . in financial
terms, its condition is deteriorating, anditsperformance shows no sign ofimproving.
(GSLIVP Authori!), 2002b: 1-2)
In the view of the SDI, the Act thus provided an opportunity to put in place an authority with
the capacity to secure the twin objectives of optimal development and ongoing conservation
in the complex conditions faced by the GSLWP. Such an institution, the SDI argued, should
not exclude the NCS from the management of the GSLWP nor undermine its financial
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position. It should rather build on the specialist strengths of the NCS by appointing it as the
conservation manager of the GSLWP.
In effect, the SDI's view of the NCS amounted to an institutional analysis in the terms
proposed by Amin and discussed at some length in Chapter 2. In the view of the SDI,
financial, organisational and ideological shortcomings of the NCS blocked the kind of
innovation which was crucial to the economic renewal of the GSLWP. The NCS had thus
become an example of what Amin calls "institutional sclerosis" which was "a source of
economic failure by acting as a block on innovation and the wider distribution of resources
and opportunity" (Amin, 1999: 373). The SDI's regional development intervention took this
institutional blockage seriously and therefore included the proposal for an institutional
reconfiguration that would create the conditions for innovation and renewal. This is a good
illustration of the Lubombo SDI's view of regional development, which consistently included
not only infrastructure development and investment promotion but also a serious
engagement with the institutional realities of the region in which it operated.
In the event, a committee, comprising representatives of the NCS, the KZN Tourism
Authority and the Lubombo SDI, was established to advise the relevant provincial and
national ministers on the matter. In addition, the premier of the province appointed an ANC
and an IFP councillor from the area to work with the SDI in building local level support.
After vigorous debate, including two presentations to the national cabinet, the matter was
resolved in favour of a new authority along the lines proposed by the SDI. Towards the end
of 1999, a memorandum of agreement was signed between the national Minister of
Environmental Affairs and the provincial MECs for Economic Development and Tourism,
and Agriculture and Environment recognising the need to establish a Section 9 authority for
the GSLWP. The agreement effectively provided constitutional sign-off with the province
consenting to a national Section 9 authority.
Following this agreement, a process was launched to draft regulations in terms of the World
Heritage Act for the establishment of the Authority. It involved widespread consultation
including interdepartmental meetings, cabinet approvals, and public meetings held under the
leadership of the relevant provincial portfolio committee. Finally, on 24 November 2000,
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regulations were published in the Government Gazette proclaiming the GSLWP and setting
in place the GSLWP Authority as its management institution. (Republic of South Africa,
2000a and b).
The proclamation of the GSLWP and the creation of the GSLWP Authority, effectively
entrenched the agenda of the SDI in law and in practice. It set in place a dedicated
management institution - the GSLWP Authority - enabled by national legislation but
structured to respond to the particular needs of the greater St Lucia area.
4. The GSLWP Authority
4.1 Introduction
The development of the GSLWP Authority and its relationship with a set of local an~
provincial actors since its establishment is not the main focus of the current study. Its main
achievements and challenges are sketched here briefly to demonstrate how the work of the
Authority has continued the programme initiated by the Lubombo SDI. In many ways, the
Authority is the institutional extension of the SDI, at least as far the SDI's anchor project is
concerned.
4.2 Structure
The proclamation of the GSLWP consolidated previously fragmented land into a single
protected area covering almost 300,OOOha. The regulations proclaiming the GSWLP also
established an Authority mandated to undertake effective and active measures for the Park's
protection, conservation, presentation and sustainable development. The Wetlands Authority
(as it became known) comprises a representative advisory Board and an executive staff
component. It reports to the national Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism with
financial oversight vested in the Auditor-General. The staff component, headed by the CEO,
is responsible for its day-to-day operations including relations with others such as DEAT,
KZN Wildlife, the KZN Tourism Authority and local government. It was organised
essentiallyalong business, rather than bureaucratic lines, characterised by a small, experienced
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and specialised management team, and by a flat organisational structure which allows for an
efficient flow of information across the organisation and for quick and responsive
managemen t and rapid decision-making.
4.3 Institutional environment
The GSLWP Authority continues to operate within a highly complex legal and institutional
environment, which involves a large number of government agencies and other stakeholders.
It is systematically developing agreements with other agencies in an attempt to clarify the roles
and responsibilities of the various stakeholders. This involves negotiations with various local,
provincial and national bodies aimed at clarifying roles and streamlining the institutional and
regulatory framework within which it operates. O ne of its first acts was, for example, the
conclusion of a conservation management agreement with KZN Wildlife and the KZ N
Tourism Authority, which spells out the division of duties between the two organisations:
KZN Wildlife's functions are day-to-day conservation management and regulatory
enforcement relating to conservation, while the Authority is exclusively responsible for
managing the Park's commercial activities as well as research, planning, zoning, WHC
oversight and the annual preparation of conservation operational plans. The following table
illustrates the complexity of the institutional environment within which the Authority and the
status of arrangements with various institutions by 2002.
Key Institu tional Arrangements
EKZN Wi ldlife
Tourism KZ bl





De par tment of Land
Affairs (RLCq
Focus Qfanrnngonen t
Day to Da y Co nservation management
Phased tran sfer o f existing EKZN WiU/!fr-managed
camps to Authori ty
Branding and marketing
Investment suppon
Provi sion o f services (water, waste, ro ads) to Park
Role in tou rism development - development con trols
Provision of services tQ Park (water, sewage)
In tegration & jQint development o f St Lucia •
Townlands and St Lucia Es tuary
Managem ent o f affected coastal areas
(conse rva tion, research & tourism activi ties)
Resolu tion o fland claims
Roles o f the Land Claims Commission, vis-a-vis •
Authori ty, in tourism development
Current status & key Qutstand ing issues
Agreement signed
Practical implementation in progre ss
Agree me nt signe d
Blue P rint complete
Practical impl emen tation in progre ss
Negotiatio ns underway
N egotiations underway
N ego tiation s underway
Negotiations underway
Prac tical impl em entation in progre ss





Commercial forestry on Park boundary
Use rights to water bodies in the Park
Touri sm on, and conservation of, Trust land in Park
National Policy in place
Negotiation s underway
Negotiation s underway
A key challenge for the Authority is thus to retain its ability to deliver in a dynamic
institutional environment and one in which the Authority is often viewed with suspicion"
One such area, is the relationship with local government where one district council and five
local municipalities are involved in negotiating their respective spheres of competence, as well
as their relationship with the A uthority. This inevitably creates power struggles, especially in
an environment where the SDI and the Authority are still som etimes a national government
initiative. Joe Muller, Director Tourism and Planning Department, Uthungulu District
Council, refers to this as the "Big Brother" syndrome. Managing such perceptions and
formalising agreements with the various organisations noted in the table above are crucial to
the long term success of the GSLWP. But this exhausts institutional resources and draws the
Authority into ongoing bargaining with young institutions that often do not have the capacity
to follow through on their ambitions." Nonetheless, the table above illustrates the extent to
which the Authority is systematically developing formal agreem ents and working relationships
with a range of institutions at the national, provincial and local levels.
32 "[Local government] started to see the LSDI/Authority as a threat to their own mandate and
political powers and started to resist or initiate their own plans even if they were in conflict with the
Park's plans" (Tooley, 2004).
33 The relationship of the GSLWP Authority with local government is not discussed in any detail here.
The scope of the study is limited to the establishment phase of the GSLWP Authority which
occurred during a period when local government was in a state of reorganization. \Vith the
emergence of reorganized local government, the relationship is obviously crucial. The manner in
which it is structured and managed will be vital to the Authority's ongoing success but is beyond the
scope of the current study.
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4.4 Social transformation
One of the principal statutory mandates and core objectives of the GSLWP Authority is
alleviation of regional poverty and the empowerment of historically disadvantaged individuals
and communities. It has entrenched this objective in its social, economic and environmental
development (SEED) programme, which is housed in a separate directorate reporting to the
Authority's CEO. Since its establishment, the SEED unit has implemented a range of
development strategies to ensure broader spread and reach in integrating the GSLWP with







An infrastructure programme modelled on the approach developed by the Lubombo
SDI. The Authority institutes rigorous procurement policies that foster equity
participation as well as the creation of SMMEs and jobs in construction during
infrastructure development in and around the park and during maintenance programmes.
During the 2002/3, a total of 3000 short term jobs were created and approximately 50%
of capital expenditure going to local SMMEs and labour.
A tourism development programme - The Authority encourages the participation of
local, historically disadvantaged mandatory partners through equity, employment and
procurement in private-sector tourism investments.
Tourism-skills development programmes and learnerships designed to prepare local
historically disadvantaged individuals for employment in all levels of the enterprises
established within the Park. To date, approximately 160 learners from the area are
enrolled in the programme.
Small-scale agricultural programmes designed to enhance livelihoods and to develop
linkages between local historically disadvantaged partners and the core businesses of the
Park.
Natural-resource harvesting programmes.
Craft programmes, which have linked 26 small-scale producers with high value decor
outlets in the main urban areas.
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• Cultural programmes, which have to date stimulated the emergence of 27 small
businesses.
4.5 Land
Former beneficial occupants of various portions of the GSLWP have claimed approximately
80% of the Park in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 1994. The GSLWP Authority
co-operated closely with the Department of Land Affairs, the Department Environmental
Affairs and Tourism and the regional Land Claims Commission to facilitate the settlement of
the three major claims covering approximately 60% of the Park's land surface in a manner
that guarantees the continued conservation of the Park within the framework of the World
Heritage Convention Act. The setdements transfer tide to the claimant communities -
providing the legal basis for greater integration between rural residents and the conservation
industry - but entrench the physical integrity and conservation status of the Park, as well as
the management role of the Authority and EKZN Wildlife. These agreements set an
important precedent for the setdement of land claims in South Africa's major protected areas
and have provided the basis for the development of a national policy dealing with land claims
in protected areas.
The Authority has also developed and started implementing a land incorporation policy, in
terms of which it has concluded agreements with private landowners that incorporate
approximately 20 OOOha of land into the Park. Another 80 000 ha of private and communal
land have been earmarked for inclusion. The incorporation of communal land into the Park
has the potential to generate significant economic returns to the communal owners and to
contribute to poverty alleviation in some of the poorest communities in the region.
The land settlements and incorporations do, however, also create major risks for the Park and
the Authority. Major expectations have been created that the Authority must manage on an
ongoing basis. This requires not only political management but also maintaining momentum
with the delivery of hard benefits to those who have included their land assets into the Park
on the expectation that this will bring benefit to their communities.
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4.6 Management planning
The regulations establishing the Park require the Authority to prepare and implement an
Integrated Management Plan (IMP) to fulfil Articles 4 and 5 of the World Heritage
Convention and Chapter IV of the World Heritage Convention Act.
The IMP must integrate developmental, environmental and governance concerns into the
management of the Park. The developmental concerns include poverty alleviation and local
economic development of communities in and adjacent to the Park as well as the stimulation
of tourism development. Where new opportunities or threats arise, or there are changed
circumstances in the social, economic and political context, an IMP may be reviewed and
amended by the Authority, and submitted to the Minister for approval. The Authority has
alreadydeveloped a draft IMP, a Strategic Environmental Assessment for the Park as a whole,
and several other subordinate planning instruments.
4.7 Park infrastructure
Legally consolidated, the various parcels of land making up the Park are presently being
redeveloped and functionally consolidated into a game reserve, which is one open ecological
area, incorporating Cape Vidal, the Eastern and Western Shores, Mkuze Game Reserve, Lake
Sibaya, Sodwana Bay and the Coastal Forest Reserve (Kosi Bay).
The Authority's corporate strategy, phases the development of the Park as follows:
•
•
short-term (5 years) - establishment and redevelopment (see below);
medium term (5 to 10 years) - maintenance - a focus on maintaining the Park and
enhancing the world heritage values rather than investing in new infrastructure - emphasis
on monitoring Park's performance, assessing our competitive edge and proactively
adapting our strategy and response to the changing environment.
The broad strategy of infrastructure development is sequential:
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• firstly, improve the infrastructure in nodes that have established markets or where there is
the potential for expanding and broadening the existing markets, by facilitating
appropriate new development,;
then focus on the less well-developed areas, where it will take longer to develop tourism
demand and markets, thereby generating revenue from the established and more
developed sections of the Park, to cross-subsidise the opening-up of less developed areas
for appropriate private-sector investment.
To date, approximately R120m has been spent on roads, fences, gates, the reintroduction of
game and the development of all weather runways adjacent to the Park. The road-
development strategy has generally been built on the logic first developed by the Lubombo
SDI: to improve general access to the area (via the N2 and the Lubombo Spine Road), and
then to create circuits within the Park that support the development programme and
investment nodes . While there has been significant progress in infrastructure development,
much remains to be done before the various fragments of land that were consolidated under
the World Heritage Convention Act regulations are knitted into a functional park.
Outstanding is, for example, the establishment of a regional airport, and the upgrade of
further access roads from the N2 & Lubombo Spine to key nodes in the Park.
4.8 Tourism
The Authority's statutory mandate - rooted in the Lubombo SDI's agenda - is to facilitate
optimal tourism-based development in the park. It does so by creating an environment that
will encourage and induce the private sector to develop and run tourist facilities, operate
tourism activities and provide services that support them. There are currently some 6 700
beds in the Park including campsites (most of which will be redeveloped), which will be
redeveloped and expanded to ±7 200. It is expected that for every tourist bed in the Park,
two are likely to be developed outside the Park on its periphery. It has embarked on a
National Treasury-supported commercialisation programme.
The Authority's objective is to create the 'space' and reduce risk for tourism, conservation
and community beneficiation to take place effectively. During the first phase of
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commercialisation, the Authority offered ten investment sites to the market. Preferred bidders
have been selected for eight of the ten sites with a combined value of over R450 million. The
successful bidders include exceptionally strong representation from empowerment groups
(with average black ownership across the various consortiums of 75%) as well as national and
intemational hotel groups. 20% of the equity in the new developments have been allocated to
local mandatory partners including land claimants. And it is estimated that the new
developments should create 900 direct jobs - increasing employment in the Umkhanyakude
district by nearly 20% - and an additional annual direct spend in the region of R300-million
annually.
5. Conclusion
The current chapter provided an overview of the GSLWP anchor project from its initial
conceptualisation to its eventual implementation. The focus was mainly on the period
between 1997, when the Lubombo SDI first defined the concept, and approximately 2002
when the GSLWP Authority became fully operational. The main concern in this chapter is to
describe how the Lubombo SDI sought to put in place the fundamentals required to
implement its anchor project, particularly an institutional structure with the capacity to drive
the economic renewal of the GSLWP. This again illustrates the seriousness with which the
Lubombo SDI regarded institutional issues, in this case the "institutional sclerosis"





In their short history, the SDIs have drawn interest from a wide range of writers. This has
seen the emergence of a varied literature - surveyed in Chapter 2 - describing the history and
principles of the programme and assessing many of its individual initiatives. A widespread
critique has developed - especially amongst those writers situated outside the programme -
that views the SD Is as falling short in two crucial areas.
1. Developmental impacts
First, much of the literature argues that SDIs have, in general, had limited developmental
impacts. The scale of their delivery as well as their developmental reach have been
disappointing, especially when measured against the ambitious claims made during the
programme's early days.
This view of the SDI programme partakes in a broader debate regarding the limited
developmental impacts of high cost investment in developing economies. Many writers have
recently argued that capital intensive industrialisation - especiallywhen anchored in resource-
based megaprojects - is inappropriate in underdeveloped settings. These projects typically
create large numbers of jobs during their construction phases but relatively few long-term
positions after the initial development is completed. This tends to draw labour migrants into
an area during the development phase with little prospect of sustainable employment during
the operational stage. Moreover, these areas are typically characterised not only by labour
surpluses but also by skills deficits. This contrasts starkly with the needs of megaprojects,
which typically require limited numbers of highly skilled employees. Rural economies also
lack the capacity to supply the goods and services required by such projects thus constraining
opportunities for local linkages and SMME creation.
Overall, the argument is that there is an asymmetry between the needs and yields of
megaprojects on the one hand and the needs and capacities of underdeveloped local
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economies on the other; megaprojects may produce spectacular growth when measured in
terms of direct investment and returns to capital but contribute little to diversification, job
creation and sustainable development in peripheral local economies'". (See, amongst others ,
Adebayo and Todes, 2003; Bond, 2002, Lewis and Bloch, 1998, Pretorius, 2001; Walker,
2001.)
This dissertation has argued that the Lubombo SDI, after some initial debate, opted for a
vigorous approach in which the state maintained an active role in extending the
developmental reach of its interventions. This approach was demonstrated in the key
infrastructure projects but has also been carried into the activities of the GSLWP Authority.
The Lubombo SDI, and its anchor project, thus consistently sought to balance growth and
development in a manner that challenges the view of writers like Soderbaum and Taylor who
view the SDI programme as little more than a "conveyor belt" for big capital. The Lubombo
SDI is an example of a practice within the broader SDI programme that is not predicated on
the short-term delivery of mega-projects in underdeveloped contexts but rather one that takes
a longer view of development and that actively seeks to manage the promotion of private-
sector driven economic growth in a manner that integrates into the local economy and
spreads developmental reach .
2. Governance and institutional issues
A second major theme in the SDI literature is the idea that many of the initiatives - despite
the gains of their "special agency" .approach - failed to develop adequate institutional
responses to the specific conditions they faced in their various localities. They failed to
34 Adebayo and Todes refer to the Richards Bay where the "long-term negative consequences" is
evident:
Whtle economicgrowth has been rapid, twen!]years on, the economy remains characterised ry ajew large
finns with poor links into the local economy, weak local linkages, low levels ifjob creation relative to
investment, and dramaticfluctuations in the local economy and the properfY market each time mq/or new
investment occurs (2003: 36).
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"embed" themselves at the local and provincial levels, which meant that they could not
mediate productively between national, provincial and local interests . These "failures" were
for a variety of reasons - including the lack of sustained political support - which were not
examined in any detail.
The study did however argue that the Lubombo SDI, throughout its history, took institutions
- in the broad sense discussed in Chapter 2 - seriously. It continually manoeuvred to open
the political and institutional space that was needed to deliver on its mandate. TIlls was aided
by the particular circumstances of the post-1994 period but it also involved ongoing effort to
mobilise and maintain political support at the local, provincial and national levels. Ultimately,
the Lubombo SDI's anchor project was embedded in the GSLWP Authority, an institution
specifically designed to deal with the specific complex of factors - infrastructural and
institutional - that constrained development in the greater St Lucia region.
In driving its agenda, the Lubombo SDI was also not particularly hindered by the limitations
of the country's fiscally restrictive approach to national macro-economic policy. It adopted a
flexible " framework approach" which allowed it to align its key strategic interventions with
the broad range of government priorities thereby enabling it to raise funds from across the
full spectrum of government.
3. A final word
In considering the Lubombo SDI and its anchor project, the two-pronged critique developed
in the literature is of vital interest. Has the Lubombo SDI achieved greater developmental
reach than other SDIs? And has it, in the words of Harrison "developed an adequate
institutional mechanism to accommodate . . . differences and achieve the necessary
compromise without destructive conflict" (1998:3)?
It is prob ably too early to give a definitive response to these questions. What is clear is that
the Lubombo SDI, from the outset, took institutions seriously and developed a longer view
of development. It did not seek to deliver large-scale investment in a short period. Rather, it
focused on shifting the development fundamentals of the Lubombo region by establishing a
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track record of delivery and concentrating its resources on facilitating a major project capable
of pulling the various agencies with a stake in the region's development onto a common
platform. This concentration of effort, and the creation of a dedicated authority with a clear
statutory mandate to promote development and conservation, has brought advances to an
area where development was effectively blocked for many years. Moreover, the fact that the
Authority was established under national legislation and reports to a board comprising
national, provincial and local representatives greatly strengthens its ability to raise resources
and political support. Its institutional location - accounting to national government but
integrated with provincial and local structures - enables it to function more effectively at the
interface between the national, provincial and local levels, which is vital to its role as an
effective driver of development in an area previously characterised by economic stagnation
and decline. In this sense, the Authority has been able to vigorously take forward the agenda
first defined by the Lubombo SDI.
But the dynamic nature of the institutional environment remains a key challenge affecting the
GSLWP and the execution of the Authority's mandate. A crucial issue - but one that falls
beyond the scope of the study - relates to the emergence of local government and its
relationship to the GSLWP and the Authority. The ability of the Authority to continue
mediating the multiple tensions and complexities affecting the GSLWP - its ability to
maintain the institutional space first opened up by the Lubombo SDI - in a changing
institutional environment will be crucial if the agenda first set by the Lubombo is to be carried
forward in the coming years and if it is to be adjudged "adequate" in Harrison's (1998) sense.
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